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Abstract

A clinician is entrusted with the difficult task of organizing, integrating, and formulating a vast
amount of information provided by a patient in order to conduct therapy. Typically, a theoretical
paradigm is employed in this endeavor. This paper constructs a theory of theoretical
paradigms—a meta-theory—to understand better how clinicians organize and understand patient
information. The theory of theory posits that theoretical paradigms function as complex
metaphors developed within a culture. The argument presented here utilizes research from
various areas of psychology—including those focusing on cognitive research, psycholinguistics,
and philosophy of theory—to develop the meta-theory. The central thesis of this research is that
theoretical paradigms function as metaphors, which were developed within a given historicalcultural context.
Keywords: Meta-theory, theoretical paradigms, metaphor, psycholinguistics
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Meta-for
Chapter 1
Metaphor is pervasive in everyday life,

not just in language but in thought and action
(Lakoff & Johnson, 2003)
A clinician is entrusted with the difficult task of organizing, integrating, and formulating
a vast amount of information provided by a patient in order to conduct therapy. Theoretical
paradigms are used in order to inform and accomplish this task. Each paradigm draws on a
unique lexicon yet functions similarly at a meta-linguistic level. The present research examines
how metaphors function (linguistically and conceptually) and develops a theory of theory. To do
this, information from various bodies in the psychological sciences were integrated, including
those focusing on cognitive research, psycholinguistics, psychoanalytic thought, and philosophy
of theory. As such, the central thesis of this research is that theoretical paradigms function as
metaphors, and that the language that comprises each paradigm is metaphoric.
Stemming from this central thesis are the following goals: (a) examine the utility of
metaphors and how they functioned, (b) explore how theoretical paradigms served as complex
metaphors, (c) develop a theory of theory based on the aforementioned research goals, (d)
understand the implications for the application of theory in research and clinical practice, and (e)
provide researchers with future directions for scholarly inquiry. By serving as metaphors,
theoretical paradigms generate a continuity of ideas and imagery that provide the clinician with
flexibility to make sense of a multitude of experiences. The focus of this research includes an
elaboration on semiotics (how words convey meaning), metaphor (how linguistic and conceptual
comparisons facilitate meaning making), and theory construction (how the linguistic aspects of
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theory utilize metaphor to organize and convey vast amounts of information). A review of the
literature will expose the reader to how metaphors differ from literal speech. Concepts such as
how multiple metaphors interact with one another introduce the reader to intended areas of
exploration. The methodology details the processes needed to develop a theory of theoretical
paradigms.
Rationale
Clinicians utilize theoretical paradigms as a means to conceptualize clinical information
and formulate interventions. Theoretical paradigms also permit one clinician to convey a
plethora of data to another in a concise yet informative manner. Functionally, theories serve as
metaphors to make conceptualization and information sharing coherent. Here it is proposed that
theories are composed of a system of interacting metaphors that not only organize the language
of the theory, but also influences how the clinician makes meaning from lived experiences.
Lakoff and Johnson (2003) and Punter (2007), for instance, explained that metaphors convey
meaning by transferring knowledge about one thing, event, or experience onto another thing,
event, or experience that is more nebulous and not as well understood. For example, in
understanding how one becomes depressed, a theory (which is proposed to function as a
metaphor) transfers one’s understanding of conflict or faulty machinery onto the more nebulous
construct of depression. A theoretical paradigm does so by relying on multiple interacting
metaphors, which provide an organized language to describe aspects of the human experience.
As such, the theory then becomes a metaphor for how one experiences and views lived
experiences.
In order to understand how theoretical paradigms function, the research on
consciousness, psycholinguistics, and metaphor formed the structure of this research’s central

3
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thesis. What followed was a set of guidelines for the aforementioned argument: For a theory to
function as a metaphor, it must (a) transfer meaning from a better known idea or experience onto
a lesser known idea or experience in order to create meaning, (b) avoid the use of terms such as
like and analogous to because these explicit terms create relationships known as similes and
analogies, and (c) be organized in a coherent manner so that one can derive meaning from the
theory. From this understanding, I utilized a “case example” of psychoanalytic theory to
elucidate how theoretical paradigms are composed of, and serve as metaphors. I also explained
how the types of metaphors embedded within psychoanalytic writing are linked to their clinical
constructs. It should be noted that psychoanalytic theory was neither explained in inordinate
detail nor critiqued for strengths and weaknesses. The purpose of this research was ultimately to
elucidate the function of theory, how the figurative language of theory evoked meaning, and
what were the implications for examining theory in this manner.
One may ask, “Why should theoretical paradigms be examined in this manner?” The
importance of this research is multifaceted. First, we are influenced—be it behaviors, feelings, or
thoughts—by language. However, there is not a comprehensive understanding of how a theory’s
language evokes meaning to guide clinical practice. The language of a theory and its structure
influence how the clinician understands human experience, which partially governs how the
clinician approaches clinical practice. The evocativeness and figurative aspects of language vary
from theory to theory. While a clinician “translates” a presenting problem into different
theoretical paradigms, the clinician’s praxis also changed accordingly. This present research
served as a useful stepping-stone for future researchers to explore the impact that the language of
their chosen theory has on their practice—as opposed to how a clinician’s theoretical paradigm
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influences her or his techniques, such as the use of metaphors, hypnosis, directive teaching, or
empathy, in therapy (cf. Cook, Biyanova, Elhia, Schnurr, & Coyne, 2010; Geslo, 1995).
Second, there are pedagogical implications for understanding a theory’s language as
figurative as opposed to literal; including whether such language is suitable for hypothesis
testing or what meaning can be gained by understanding the language as metaphor. Third, by
understanding the meaning that is conveyed through the figurative and connotative elements of a
theory’s language, professionals can develop a greater understanding of the biases inherent in the
theory. This is important given the fact that the American Psychological Association (APA) touts
that psychologists must be aware of their biases. Understanding one’s ethnic and racial biases or
the sources of one’s countertransference are helpful, yet, the very language that we use to
approach our work undoubtedly creates leanings and biases as well. For instance, describing
depression as being the result of a personified object is very different than describing it as
resulting from a faulty piece of machinery. This inevitably guides how a clinician engages the
therapeutic process with the patient, particularly, the language used within the therapy session,
within the progress note, or just simply thinking about the case and future directions. This
research served as a foundation to understand the figurative elements of various theoretical
paradigms.
It seems fitting that the clinician is made aware of the language that is guiding her or his
approach to conducting therapy, and this research intended to illuminate the metaphoric structure
inherent in the language of theory, which ultimately guides the clinician's practice. This notion
goes beyond the idea of a theory merely providing ideas to guide practice. It also extends beyond
developing another theoretical paradigm to be placed into clinical efficacy studies. Rather, it is a
more nuanced understanding of how Psychology’s theoretical paradigms are utilized in
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education, research, and practice. Much of the research in psychology has focused on the
effectiveness of a theory or process on a given psychological or behavioral construct like
depression, psychological growth, or overt behaviors through case studies, quasi-experimental
designs, or randomized-controlled trials. This research was aimed at exploring the types of
elements that comprised the language of a theory and the implications for understanding these
elements as metaphorical, as opposed to literal.
Conceptual Framework
To understand how theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors, it is imperative that one
understands how language—the medium by which our theoretical paradigms are
conveyed—creates reality. For this research the following two ontological assumptions that were
made regarding how figurative language evoked meaning in theoretical paradigms: (a) language
is a form of agreed communication between two or more individuals, and (b) language is
interpreted by an individual based upon his or her lived experiences. These ontological
assumptions are rooted in social constructionism and phenomenology, respectively. It was not
the purpose of this research to affirm one perspective over another, but to view language as a
complex construct that has a significant impact on how one understands the world.
To understand how the social constructionist and phenomenological perspectives guided
this research, it was essential to understand what these philosophical underpinnings represented.
Both social constructionism and phenomenology have ontological and epistemological
assumptions. Meaning, they frame what something is (ontology), and how one comes to know
something (epistemology) (Hofweber, 2012; Smith, 2011). Each frame, social constructionism
and phenomenology, differs in terms of explicating the bases of ontology and epistemology.
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However, the two are complementary and appropriate frames for working with the linguistic
devices of theory.
Social constructionism. Gergen (2007) stated that dialog occurs within a relationship, be
it a relationship with another, or oneself. He also stated that it is the relationship that provides the
context and meaning to the language used to create the dialog. If the reader considers that a
relationship can be created not just between individuals, but also with objects or constructs, then
one can understand how society impacts the individual. For instance, the term society can be
understood through the ecological developmental lens of Bronfenbrenner (1979, 2005), who
explained that we engage in bidirectional interactions with the values, language, and beliefs that
are disseminated through other ecological systems including the media, schools, parents, and
peers. We “know” what is beautiful based on what is portrayed in the media and enacted
amongst friends, just as we “know” what is good literature based on what we learn in school or
what is popular amongst peers. Our interaction with these aforementioned systems, in turn,
influences society to develop a worldview. In essence, there is a relationship formed between the
individual and the collective (society) through other individuals, groups, organizations, and
systems. What is noteworthy here is that an individual develops based on his or her interaction
with others, from which norms and ways of knowing are generated and perpetuated. Gergen
postulated that our notions of right and wrong, good and evil, fact and fiction, are constructed
based on our interactions with society. Gergen also expressed that writing (in reference to
academia) is also a relationship, but one that is formed between the reader and the author,
whereby the two, through the writing, develop a shared language and sense of meaning. In
psychology and psychiatry, these discursive relationships between reader and author are formed
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in an attempt to approximate human experience with a lexicon, which can be dubbed as a theory,
model, or hypothesis.
Given the ineffability of the human experience, these theorists utilized the language
available within their respective sociohistorical contexts—the language, values, proscriptions,
beliefs, and knowledge of a society at a particular time—to develop constructs to guide the
process between the analyst/therapist/clinician and the analysand/patient/client. 1 Even with
these terms, one can see how groups of individuals within the field of psychology have socially
constructed meaning regarding language to describe the same two people within a therapeutic
context—the individual conducting therapy and the individual engaging in therapy. Depending
on one’s training, specific terms are favored over others. Consider the differences in language
and approach between those trained in the medical model and those trained in the humanist
model of clinical work (cf. Gurman & Messer, 2003). A theorist living in 19th Century Austria
would be influenced by a sociohistorical context that is quite different from that of a theorist
living in 20th Century America. The ideas and constructs postulated by these respective theorists
would represent the language, proscriptions, beliefs, and societal worldview that given point in
history. This context is created within the frame of the scholarly work. The figurative use of
language, structure of this research, and conclusions drawn, express the sociohistorical context in
which this research was conducted. To elucidate, consider the scholarly articles that were written
during this research sociohistorical context. The Publication Manual of the American
Psychological Association 6th Edition (American Psychological Association, 2010) outlines the
format for the paper (introduction, methodology, results, discussion); encourages authors to

1

It should be noted here that, for brevity’s sake, the terms clinician and patient will be utilized throughout this
manuscript. This is merely a preference to avoid confusion and redundancy. The use of any other terminology will
be elucidated within the context of analyzing the language of the theory (i.e., the use of the term analysand in
psychoanalysis).
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utilize clear, precise language that does not rely on poetic and figurative phrasing; and
encourages authors to utilize neutral language that is multiculturally sensitive. Contrast that with
Freud’s (1923/1960) The Ego and the Id. The phrase “the ego ideal is the heir to the Oedipus
complex” (Freud, 1923/1960, p. 32) is a prime, illustrative example of figurative language. Even
if the concepts of ego ideal and the Oedipus complex are understood as literal—these are
physical constructs that could be examined—for one to be the heir of another is implausible.
Rather, the poetic language may evoke very different images and associations than if it were
written as “The ego ideal is the set of beliefs that results from the Oedipus complex.” Freud, it
will be argued, lived in a sociohistorical context that permitted the use of more evocative
language and, thus, influenced how a clinician would understand and approach the practice of
therapy.
What is important to understand from the above example is the author’s relationship with
society and this relationship duly influenced how he viewed the world. As previously mentioned,
individuals develop relationships with society through peers, colleagues, media, etc. Gergen
(2007) explained how language and dialog influence an individual’s perception of the world.
Therefore, within a particular society and time period, an individual will develop a psychology
that is unique, which includes a vernacular as well as a set of morals, proscriptions, and social
norms (cf. Bronfenbrenner, 1979, 2005; Gergen, 2007). This intersection of human development
and societal relationships is what yields a sociohistorical context. One’s worldview is conveyed
in subtle but sometimes obvious ways. The reader of this scholarly work may develop a
relationship with the author and his sense of meaning making. Simultaneously, the reader has a
worldview based on his or her relationship with society at a particular point in time. Essentially,
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both reader and author develop meaning through their relationships with different systems (cf.
Bronfenbrenner, 2005).
Within the context of theory development, a theory is created during a particular
sociohistorical context and serves as substitute for the non-physical entities of thought, emotion,
process, experience, and meaning. It was argued that the development of these constructs relied
on what was already known at the time, to convey meaning between the theorist and the reader
through language. In particular, these constructs served as metaphors. Thus, social negotiations
occurred through discourse to determine what was “real” regarding the human experience and
meaning making.
Phenomenology. The second ontological assumption of this research was rooted in
phenomenology and focused on the hermeneutic process of reading and interpreting the
linguistic elements of theory. The term hermeneutics describes the process of understanding and
interpreting symbolic forms of communication, whether it is linguistic, or non-linguistic
(Ramberg & Gjesdal, 2005). Hermeneutics is a process of individualized interpretation of
symbols and language, and it serves as an important aspect of phenomenological inquiry.
Phenomenology is a philosophy rooted in Husserl’s work and is focused on an individual’s
subjective experience (Robson, 2002). One of Husserl’s assumptions, according to Giorgi and
Giorgi (2008), is that our world is interpreted through a filter of one’s lived experiences. Within
the framework of Bronfenbrenner (2005), over time, an individual interacts with a myriad of
individuals and systems. Each interaction is unique and no two individuals will ever have the
same sets of experiences. As such, each individual will have different associations, memories,
feelings, and experiences, which duly influence how that individual interprets the world.
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Consider that when an individual hears, reads, or sees something, that individual may
have associations to the stimulus. Given that every individual has a unique set of lived
experiences, these associations will impact how an individual will interpret the stimulus.
Phenomenology attempts to understand the conscious experience of the individual such as
emotions and thoughts, as well as, the import of language and cultural influences/social practices
as they relate to perception and interpretation (Smith, 2011).
This research focused on illuminating the evocative and figurative language embedded
within theoretical paradigms, which was done by deconstructing the paradigm into its constituent
metaphors. Understanding these linguistic tropes at the interface of social influence and personal
experience is what underlies phenomenological inquiry. The ontological and epistemological
assumptions of phenomenology—the unique way which humans have experiences and how they
know what they know—are rooted in describing experience and something that theoretical
paradigms attempt to capture. As such, this research was guided by a phenomenological
hermeneutic process and, consequently serves as a hermeneutic of theoretical paradigms.
Conceptual framework summary. Psychology’s theoretical paradigms, which serve as
metaphors, create a dialogic meaning making process about the therapeutic work, as well as, a
conceptualization of human experience. This socially constructed language is duly influenced by
the manner in which an individual interprets the readings and teachings of the theorists. The
phenomenological hermeneutic process results in individuals having different experiences to the
language of the theory, which ultimately, influences the meaning that individuals derive from a
given experience. What can be seen is that social constructionism and phenomenology comprise
different layers of ways of knowing (epistemology) and being (ontology).
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Theories are comprised of ideas that are organized and conveyed through language. The
linguistic and symbolic elements of a theory, organize and convey ideas that are influenced by an
individual’s sociohistorical context in which the individual interacts and influences bidirectional.
Bronfenbrenner’s (2005) bioecological theory posits how one develops within a sociohistorical
context and the manner in which one interacts within this context. That is, these interactions
occur within nested systems ranging from the individual, to society, and how changes over time.
A theoretician, therefore, develops a theory based on his or her interpretation of lived
experiences, which are duly influenced by the social constructions generated between the
theoretician and society. Subsequently, the theoretician conveys the theory through dialog with
others through a language influenced by society and time (sociohistorical context). Meaning
about what exists and what is known is illustrated by a theory through this language, which then
engages others (e.g., readers) in a dialog.
For instance, psychoanalytic theory 2 can be conceptualized as a socially constructed
metaphor to explain how a society viewed human experience during the time of Freud. Freud’s
lived experiences and interactions with society influenced his own epistemology and ontology.
When various individuals read Freud’s works, differences began to arise because the
interpretation of the metaphor (psychoanalytic theory) through the phenomenological
hermeneutic process moved across sociohistorical contexts. Stated another way, individuals in
different times and societies, interpreted psychoanalysis in ways that reflected their own lived
experiences and the cultures. Those metaphors that were resonant with others became dialogic
and, again, became a socially constructed concept. Psychoanalysis at the beginning of the 20th
Century in Austria is different from psychoanalysis at the beginning of the 21st Century in the
2

Note that the use of the terms psychoanalysis, psychoanalytic theory, and psychoanalytic thought are used to
denote Freud’s understanding of psychoanalytic theory. This distinction is made for the purpose of analyzing the
language of the theory itself.
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United States. It should be noted that although this would appear to be a linear process with ebb
and flow, it is best to understand these as simultaneous processes that result in the ever-evolving
language of psychology. As was argued, this process occurred because of the salience of the
metaphor and the associations created when forming the metaphor itself.
Overview and Operational Definitions
To lay the foundation for understanding how theoretical paradigms serve as metaphor, it
is essential to have an understanding of what metaphors are, what types of metaphors exist in the
body of the psycholinguistic literature, and how metaphors are structured. What follows are
operational definitions to delineate metaphor from other linguistic tropes. Operational definitions
are also provided for how metaphors are linguistically created and socially defined.
Linguistic tropes. A metaphor uses a word or phrase to describe an object or action in
terms of another. It is also a linguistic means to create symbolic or representative parallels
between two concepts—especially abstract ones (Metaphor, 2009). Etymologically, the origin of
the word metaphor is from Greek, meta- (across) and -pherein (to bear or carry), or simply to
transfer or carry across (Metaphor, 2009; Metaphor, 2010a; Metaphor, 2010b). The term
metaphor is in and of itself a metaphor, which may evoke an image of carrying meaning over a
chasm and across a bridge from one person to another. Metaphors can serve as intrapersonal,
referential devices that link information in the verbal and non-verbal systems (Ellenhorn, 1989).
In this sense, metaphor is a linguistic device that links concepts together in ways that convey
meaning in a manner that extends beyond literal language. For instance, a literal utterance would
be “Margaret is standing next to a rock” while a metaphoric one would be “Margaret is a rock.”
In the latter—unless someone has named a rock Margaret—the metaphor conveys a sturdiness of
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Margaret’s character by developing a relationship with attributes of a rock (e.g., sturdy and
supportive).
Given that there are other linguistic tools, such as metonymy, analogy, and simile, the
aforementioned definition of metaphor can be expanded and made more precise by indicating
what a metaphor is not. A metaphor is not a metonymy, which is the process of substituting an
attribute of something to serve in the place of that thing (Metonymy, 2009). For example,
consider the phrase, “There are discussions with Washington” whereby the city of Washington,
DC is substituted for the federal government of the United States. In this case, a relationship
between Washington, DC and the Federal government is already established: The three branches
of the United States government are headquartered in the federal district of Washington DC,
which is commonly referred to as simply Washington.
Additionally, a metaphor is not an analogy, which is a comparison between two
constructs, usually based on structure, and utilized for clarification (Analogy, 2009).
Conceptually, an analogy relies on the notion that the two constructs under comparison share
some similar structure. For instance, the chlorophyll found in plants are analogous to the
photovoltaic cells in solar panels; males and females have analogous, anatomical structures (e.g.,
penis : clitoris :: scrotum : labia); and books and videos have analogous sections (e.g., table of
contents : main menu :: references : end credits). What is important to understand is that to create
an analogy, both objects under comparison must have similar conceptual, structural, or
functional derivations and this comparison is made explicit through elaboration. This can be
accomplished through pictures or language.
Finally, a metaphor is not a simile. A simile is a figure of speech that relies on making a
comparison more vivid by utilizing conjunctions such as like or as (Simile, 2009). While similar

THEORY AS METAPHOR

15

to a metaphor in being a figure of speech, the simile makes the comparison more explicit by
using conjunctions or adverbs—like and as, respectively. For instance, “Laura’s eyes are like
sapphires sparkling in the sun” is a simile while “Laura’s eyes are sapphires sparkling in the
sun” is a metaphor. As can be seen in this example, the simile draws the comparison to the fore
with the word like while the metaphor creates what could be construed as a literal or veridical
utterance.
Some authors have posed that simile and metonymy are types of metaphors (Punter,
2007). Punter (2007) argued that simile is the simplest type of metaphor because the relationship
between the two objects is explicitly labeled with like or as. As outlined by Glucksberg (2008),
metaphors, when compared to similes, tend to elicit more emergent ideas that are functionally
and conceptually different. Similarly, distinctions have been made between metonymy and
metaphor. To elucidate, Deignan and Potter (2004) examined the corpus of literature on
metaphor and metonymy. The authors found that in both English and Italian, there tends to be an
interaction between metonymic and metaphoric statements in everyday speech, however, they
are in fact distinct constructs. For the purpose of this research, simile, metonymy, and metaphor
are understood as distinct linguistic structures given their differences in syntax, structure, and
function.
Consider the following example to understand how excitable and energetic someone is:
“Michael is a busy bee” (a metaphor). However, one would not say that “Michael’s nose is
analogous to a busy bee’s antennae [the olfactory organ]” (an analogy) or that “Michael is like a
busy bee” (a simile). Suffice to say, metaphor consists of two components, which are linked
together to form a relationship that conveys meaning beyond what either component conveys
alone. The meaning conveyed through metaphor is implicitly drawn by avoiding linking terms
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such as like and analogous to. Similarly, metaphor does not convey meaning by substituting a
word or expression for something else that bears a relationship to the word or expression (i.e.,
Washington, DC for the Federal government of the United States)—in fact, a metaphor can
utilize two starkly different things to form a relationship over a single attribute (i.e., John is a
rock.). None of these tropes, however, are literal utterances of speech. To interpret any of these
statements as literal merely leads to a confusing understanding at best and a nonsensical
understanding at worst (i.e., Margaret is actually a rock; Laura’s eyes are actually sapphires;
Michael is actually a bee that is busy; Someone is actually speaking to the federal district of
Washington, DC). The meaning derived then comes from the extension of the relationship
between what is already known, and what is yet known.
Structure of metaphors. Metaphors are linguistic devices that have structure and create
and extend meaning by tying two ideas or concepts together. Various terms exist to describe the
structure of a metaphor, which tend to differ more on lexical grounds than on pragmatic or
functional grounds. While the actual words or symbols utilized to describe the structure of
metaphor differ, the concepts that these words represent are quite similar. Although these terms
will be described in greater detail, it is important to introduce the reader to the lexical variations
in the literature regarding metaphor and its constructions. Different authors describe metaphors
as what results from a relationship between two linguistic concepts. For instance, Jaynes (1976),
in his book on consciousness and thought, used the terms metaphrand and metaphier; Kittay
(1987) used the terms vehicle and topic; Black (1962 as cited in Kittay, 1987) used the terms
principle subject and subsidiary subject. What follows is a detailed description of the various
components of metaphor. The experience of love (one component of the metaphor) can be placed
in a relationship to the experience of a journey (the second component of the metaphor) so that
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one is used to provide meaning to the other. This is essential to note because if theoretical
paradigms serve as metaphors, and if metaphors require two things, ideas, or experiences to be
placed in a relationship with one another, then the reader must be able to decipher what is in a
relationship with what else in terms of a theoretical paradigm. What follows will detail how
things, ideas, people, or experiences can be placed into a relationship with one another and,
moreover, how constructing metaphors generate meaning.
Metaphrand/Metaphier. Jaynes (1976) explains that a metaphrand is a lesser known
construct placed in relation to the metaphier—a known or concretized concept. The metaphier,
previously known experiences, has with it associated attributes known as paraphiers, which are
displaced onto the metaphrand, creating paraphrands. To describe an individual who has strong
work ethic and the capacity to not be overwhelmed, one may say that, “Burt is a workhorse.”
The workhorse (the metaphier) is strong, diligent, and capable (the paraphiers). Burt’s
personality (the metaphrand) is unknown and abstract but takes on the attributes associated with
a workhorse, thus, creating paraphrands. The meaning derived about Burt’s personality comes
from the metaphier operating on the metaphrand by, ultimately, displacing attributes of the
metaphier (paraphiers) onto the metaphrand (paraphrands).
According to Jaynes (1970), language is one of the three bases of consciousness and
relies heavily on metaphors in order to expand one’s understanding of what is not known by
what is already known. It is noted that metaphors are dynamically created and continuously
altered. When one metaphor can no longer explain a phenomenon, a new metaphor is created to
take its place.
Vehicle/Topic. Kittay (1987) preferred the terms vehicle and topic when understanding
the structure of metaphor. The vehicle is the phrase or word utilized to transport the content of an

THEORY AS METAPHOR

18

idea, or the term to be understood metaphorically. The topic is the meaning of the text or the
term to be understood literally. Her work builds off of Richard’s 1936 work, The Philosophy of
Rhetoric, which discusses vehicle and tenor. Black’s 1962 work, Models of Metaphor, describes
the similar constructs as the principle and subsidiary subjects (analogous to vehicle and topic).
Given the similarity in structure, these authors will not be discussed but, nonetheless, credited.
Kittay favors the term vehicle because of its linguistic similarities to metaphor (both indicating
transporting or carrying). Using the earlier example of “Burt is a workhorse,” Burt is the topic
while workhorse is the vehicle. This may seem quite analogous to metaphrand/metaphier. And
indeed, there are strong similarities. Kittay’s conceptualization, however, includes that
metaphors are the interaction of systems whereby a tension (difference) develops between the
vehicle and topic.
Frame. The frame of the metaphor is the context, whether linguistic or contextual, that
serves as the minimal unit to establish incongruity (Kittay, 1987). As noted previously, a tension
must exist between the vehicle and the topic, and the frame is what produces the necessary
tension for the metaphor to occur. Again, using “Burt is a workhorse,” the frame is a complex set
of clues that provide the necessary tension. Up till this point, the reader may note that Burt was
never explicitly stated to be a person. The fact that this research is a doctoral dissertation in
clinical psychology and focused on metaphors is what set the frame that Burt is a person;
however, if this were a case study on equines as work animals, this statement could be
understood as literal (a workhorse named Burt). Thus, there is a contextual frame that creates the
metaphor, “Burt is a workhorse.”
Consider another example, this time provided by Kittay (1987). Slum is bloom. In this
case, the author indicates that tension exists between the processing of a flower blooming
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(vehicle) and a slum (topic). When described as, “The slum is littered with bloom and ash” and
placed in the context the Los Angeles riots, the metaphor disappears because the second, lesser
known definition of bloom is unworked metal of puddled iron. As Kittay described, during the
riots in Los Angeles, cars were set ablaze resulting in masses of iron (bloom) and ash. A
linguistic frame is created if the syntax provides the tension needed to create a metaphor. For
instance, “The slum is a bloom of ash” would provide explicit, lexical cues that bloom refers to a
flower to serve as the vehicle. This is opposed to the literal utterance, “The slum is littered with
bloom and ash” which indicated that puddled iron and ash is strewn across a slum.
As indicated in the above example, as well as many others in this research, linguistic and
contextual frames are used in synchrony to produce the tension needed to create a metaphor. This
is important to note because theoretical paradigms are discussed within a particular frame,
however, the frame may not be as explicit as the examples provided thus far and, as such, may
lead to misinterpretation.
Summary and integration of metaphoric structure. Metaphors are created when a
metaphier and its network of paraphiers, which will cumulatively be known as the vehicle,
operate on a lesser known or abstract construct known as a metaphrand. The metaphrand and its
network of associations as well as those displaced paraphiers (paraphrands) will cumulatively be
known as the topic. All this occurs within a frame, either linguistic or contextual, to indicate that
the relationship is to be understood metaphorically. The frame creates a necessary tension so that
the utterance is understood as a relationship ultimately resulting in a metaphoric understanding.
The language that is used to create the metaphor and some of the paraphiers are socially
constructed to convey a shared meaning between two individuals. The differences in paraphiers
and the displacement of specific paraphiers onto the metaphrand (paraphrands) are based on the

THEORY AS METAPHOR

20

individual’s lived experiences and may explain the varying degree of salience that a metaphor
has with different individuals. Two individuals may generate a common understanding of what
the metaphor conveys, yet, each individual’s own lived experiences result in nuanced
associations, which ultimately influences the metaphor’s meaning. Figure 1 depicts a
representation of how a metaphier and its associated paraphiers (vehicle) operate on the
metaphrand and its paraphiers (topic) (See Appendix A for a glossary of terms).

THEORY AS METAPHOR

21

Figure 1. A metaphor is created when a metaphier with its paraphiers (vehicle) operates on a
metaphrand and its paraphrands (topic) by displacing paraphiers. This relationship is formed
within a frame to permit the relationship to be understood as metaphorical. The frame can be
linguistically or contextually created.
Similarly, what can be seen is that the salience of the metaphor is proportionate to the
number of paraphiers that are displaced onto the metaphrand (paraphiers becoming paraphrands).
This approximation can be expressed by the formula N Px S Metaphor where N Px represents the
number of displaced paraphiers onto the metaphrand and S Metaphor is the salience of the metaphor.
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It should be noted that the salience of a metaphor can change across time and context and, as
such, is dynamic rather than static.
Types of metaphors. Now that it has been established that metaphors are created by
forming a relationship between a vehicle and topic, it is important to understand the different
type of metaphors that exist. Over time, certain types of relationships have been created that have
high salience, despite idiosyncratic associations. This means that the number of paraphiers that
can be displaced onto the metaphrand (cf. N Px S Metaphor ) is high. Table 1 provides a number of
metaphors that have yielded high salience over time. These different metaphors have been named
due to the quality of the relationship formed between the metaphier and metaphrand.
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Table 1
Types of Metaphors and Their Definitions
Metaphor Type

Description

Container

a metaphor which conveys the notion that an abstract concept
resembles a container (e.g., “I am going out of my mind” or “I
need to get into his head”)

Cross-Modal

a metaphor which utilizes the perception of one medium to
describe the perception of another medium (e.g.,“This music is
sad”)

Mind-as-Machine

a type of ontological metaphor (see below) that utilizes machinery
as a means to understand the components of the mind and
(sometimes) the brain (e.g., “My mind is not working today” or “I
had a break down last year” or “The brain is programed to
respond to stimuli in a certain way”)

Movement–Movement

a metaphor to perceive the movement of one object in terms of the
movement of another object (e.g., a spinning top is viewed as a
ballerina or vice versa)

Nominal

a metaphor which is structured around two or more distinct nouns
to draw similarities from one to be applied to another (e.g., “This
job is a prison”)

Ocular

a visual-spatial metaphor utilized to convey the quality of insight
(i.e., “She can clearly see her patterns of behavior”), a conveyance
of understanding (i.e., “I see that you are in pain” [reflection]), or
a form of communicating (e.g., “That was a colorful account of
the incident”)

Ontological

a metaphor which gives the perception of substance to an abstract,
non-substantive object (e.g., “Inflation makes me sick” or “We are
working towards peace” or “My mind just isn’t operating today”)

Orientational

a metaphor which relies on directionality to describe one concept
in terms of another (e.g., “I am feeling down” or “My spirits have
risen” or “She is depressed”)

Perceptual–Affect

a metaphor which utilizes the perception of one object to represent
an affect (e.g., the grill of a car is perceived to be smiling, angry,
or mean.)
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Perceptual–Perceptual

a metaphor which utilizes the stimuli of one object to perceive
another object (e.g., a plate of spaghetti is seen as a plate of
worms)

Personification

a type of ontological metaphor which relies on utilizing human
attributes to describe an abstract, non-substantive object (e.g.,
“Inflation has destroyed the dollar”)

Predicate

a metaphor which relies on motion verbs to draw similarities from
one concept to apply it to another (e.g., “The man fell under her
spell”)

Structural

a metaphor which not only orients the person (as with ontological
or orientation metaphors) but also is highly structured on an
already clarified concept (e.g., An argument is spoken about in
terms of war)

Note. Terms are complied from various sources including, Chen, Widick, and Chaterjee (2008); Lakoff
and Johnson (1980); Schafer, (2003); and Seitz (2005).

Conventional metaphors. Lakoff and Johnson (2003) explained the conventionality of
metaphors within the English linguistic system. A conventional metaphor is any metaphor that is
created and utilized by individuals in a way that shapes our worldview, but may not be
understood as a metaphor due to repeated use within a culture. Consider the example provided by
Lakoff and Johnson, “The solution to my problems.” This conventional metaphor relies on
mathematics to elucidate that there is a single answer that can be solved and that, once it is
solved, the solution (and process of attaining the solution) is available to that individual. Other
conventional metaphors can include the structural metaphor in which strong emotions are viewed
as down while rationality is viewed as up. For instance one “Falls in love” but “Rises to reason.”
In these examples, the metaphor may not be explicit and, in fact, may be understood as a literal
utterance such as “The grass is green.”
Novel metaphors. From Lakoff and Johnson’s (2003) own experience, this same
statement (“The solution to my problems”) can be viewed as a novel metaphor when chemistry is
substituted for mathematics. That is, the tension between the vehicle and topic is palpable due to

THEORY AS METAPHOR

25

the lack of use of the relationship. A novel metaphor is any metaphor that is created or utilized
by an individual yet, due to a lack of repeated use, is understood to be a metaphor. The authors
recalled an Iranian student who viewed the phrase “The solution to my problems” in terms of a
chemical solution in which problems bubbled and dissipated depending on what was added. This
resulted in the worldview that problems never went away but, rather, anything that the individual
introduced into the solution should be considered so as not to permit a new problem to bubble
up. Another example of a novel metaphor includes “Love is a work of art,” because it requires
patience, appreciation for aesthetics, and work. The meaning derived of this is likely different
between two teenagers in a relationship and two adults in a relationship.
Conventionality and novelty. As can be seen from the above examples, conventional and
novel metaphors may be difficult to disambiguate. Appendix B contains a non-inclusive list of
conventional metaphors outlined by Lakoff and Johnson (2003). The metaphors in Appendix B
are understood readily; however, they bear little resemblance to what one may consider a
metaphor to be. Conventional metaphors develop familiarity within a cultural context and, thus,
begin to be viewed less as simple comparisons and more as systems or categories (cf.
Glucksberg, 2008). This research understood theoretical paradigms served the clinician-intraining as novel metaphors but, over time, became conventional metaphors as the clinician
became better versed in the theory.
Nested metaphors. The term nested metaphors is a term that is proposed by the present
author and denotes when multiple types of metaphors are structured together around a core
metaphor, often due to increasing complexity of the metaphor. To elucidate, consider the
following example in which an individual expresses her or his experience of being caught
between two ideas and does not know what to do:
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My mind just isn’t working today. There’s all this pressure from these opposing ideas.
The gears are just grinding to a halt. I am just stuck. There’s so much pressure to make a
decision that I may explode! 3
In this example, the core metaphor, the metaphor that determines the language of other salient
metaphors, is that of a mind-as-a-machine metaphor. The mind is a machine (consciousness,
focus, attention, and thought) working within a structure that permits the build up of pressure and
is built on opposing ideas (gears in orientational placement to one another) that has left the
individual indecisive or ambivalent (being stuck; grinding to a halt; experiencing pressure to the
point of explosion). To illustrate this, see Figure 2 below.

3

In this example, italics are utilized to emphasize the types of metaphor in use.
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Figure 2. The figure provides a visual representation of how metaphors are extended beyond a
single phrase, which results in different types of metaphors being utilized, yet, simultaneously
maintaining the core metaphor’s content.
As can been seen, with such increasing complexity, different types of metaphors are
utilized to approximate the experience of being unable to engage in action due to opposing ideas
with the potential to lead to an explosion or a meltdown. It should be noted that the length of the
sentence or phrase does not necessarily introduce a nested metaphor, rather, it is the size and
complexity of the thought attempting to be conveyed that does so.
Semiotics of metaphor use. Given the structure and basic forms that metaphors can take,
it is necessary to understand how theoretical paradigms, when serving as metaphors, are utilized
and understood by the clinician. Phillips (2000) indicated that the Peirce’s triadic sign (the
sign–object–interpretant relationship) is essential to meaning making as humans are
symbol-based beings. It will be discussed later how the sign–object–interpretant triad permits
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theoretical paradigms function as metaphors within clinical practice.
Sign. A sign is, in short, a symbol, utterance, or thing for something else (Phillips, 2000).
It indicates to an individual the existence of something. For instance, Atkin (2010) used the
example of a molehill. The molehill is a sign not because it is a thing but, rather, that it stands for
something: the presence of a mole. This basic example utilizes a physical entity, however, it
should be noted that, because we are linguistic and symbolic beings, we rely on the translation of
language into meaning (the semiotic process). It is therefore understood that signs can be
physical, linguistic, or conceptual.
Object. In the molehill example above, the mole—whether seen by an individual or
not—is the object. An object is indicated by the sign and is part of the triadic relationship that
facilitates interpretation and meaning making (Atkin, 2010). Like the sign, an object can be
physical, conceptual, or linguistic.
Interpretant. The interpretant results from the meaning derived from the sign–object
relationship and serves as a translation of the sign (Atkin, 2010). The interpretant has two
components, the immediate interpretant (what is readily observed and understood) and the
dynamic interpretant (the deeper meaning associated with the sign–object relationship). In the
molehill example provided above, the immediate interpretant is that the molehill is composed of
earth and has been shaped from the digging process. The understanding that the mole created the
molehill as a place to exist, feed, and breed serves as the dynamic interpretant. Overall, the
interpretant will become a sign with its associated object and interpretant—the process of which
continues ad infinitum (Atkin, 2010).
Summary of semiotics. The utilization of Peircean semiotics is to explain how the
metaphor of the theoretical paradigm serves the clinician in practice. This perspective is essential
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to the functionality of the theoretical paradigm and is congruent with this research and the
existing literature. First, the triadic nature of the sign–object–interpretant relationship is a
comparable overlay to the vehicle–topic–metaphor relationship. Second, meaning is derived by
placing linguistic components into a relationship with one another. Thus, meaning making is a
relational, dynamic process with idiographic influences. Third, the purpose of a theoretical
paradigm is not just to understand human experience, but, to apply the theory to effect change
within the frame of therapy. This application of theory builds off of the establishment of Peircean
semiotics for the interpretation of theory in practice (cf. Muller & Brent, 2000). Finally, this
semiotic process maintains the linguistic framework of this research by linking symbols (e.g.,
physical, linguistic, or experiential) to meaning making.
Chapter Summary
Language can be used flexibly and in a manner that carries meaning through personal and
cultural associations. There are numerous instances during which metaphors are utilized without
the speaker’s or writer’s explicit knowledge, and metaphoric speech is no longer heard as
metaphoric. Consider such phrases as, “I am filled with hope” which conveys the meaning that
hope is a substance and the speaker is a container to be filled with the substance. In this example,
it is plausible that many people would not hear this statement as a metaphor, rather, it is just
something that is said (Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). Thus, it is important to examine carefully the
language utilized within the theoretical paradigm and how the theoretical paradigm similarly
functions.
Based on the information provided, metaphors can be understood to possess the
following characteristics:
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Metaphors are created through the relationship between a known (or better known)
construct (metaphier) and a lesser known construct (metaphrand).
These constructs are composed of systems, the vehicle (metaphier and paraphiers)
acting on the topic (metaphrand and paraphrands).
The relationship between the vehicle and the topic facilitates the meaning making
process by displacing attributes (e.g., images, concepts, and linguistic expressions) of
the better known construct onto the lesser known construct. Meaning, paraphiers are
displaced onto the metaphrand, to create paraphrands.
Metaphors require a frame to create tension between the vehicle and topic to indicate
that the language is not to be understood literally, but metaphorically.
The salience of the metaphor can be understood in terms of the degree of
displacement of the paraphiers as expressed in the equation N Px α S Metaphor .
Over time, metaphors become conventional modes of linguistic expression and may
not appear as metaphors at all.
Metaphors can be socially constructed and understood through a phenomenological,
hermeneutic process.
Metaphors do not function as other linguistic tropes—metonymy, simile, and
analogy—in terms of semantic structure, which strengthens the relationship between
the vehicle and topic.
It will be argued in the next chapters that theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors and that they
function in therapy through a Peircean, semiotic process.
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Chapter 2

As can be seen in the area of linguistics, metaphors are generated in order
to apply meaning to abstract concepts and ideas (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). Theoretical
paradigms in psychotherapy are intended to guide the clinician through the therapeutic process
and facilitate better psychotherapeutic outcomes (Ambhül & Orlinsky, 1997). Essentially, a
theoretical paradigm attempts to approximate a patient’s experience or how the patient functions,
and this informs the clinician how to engage in the dyadic exchange between them. This chapter
details how theoretical paradigms function as metaphors and how their linguistic components are
comprised of metaphors. The language of each theoretical paradigm, however, varies in the type
and number of metaphors that comprise its linguistic elements. It will be further argued that each
theoretical paradigm, itself, serves as a metaphoric guide that the clinician can utilize in practice.
The language of each of the theoretical paradigms, however, has undergone little
examination in terms of its linguistic composition and function when compared to its use and
efficacy. This chapter details (a) how to understand theoretical paradigms as metaphors at a
linguistic level, (b) how theoretical paradigms are composed of metaphors, and (c) how the
theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors for the clinician (i.e., his or her way of thinking and
relating).
The Metaphors that Exist in Psychology
Psychology’s roots can be traced back to philosophy and science. Hothersall (1984)
described that over the course of history, there has been a search to define what the mind is and
how it works. In Ancient Greece, for instance, the mind was understood to consist of matter.
Descartes posited dualism, stating that the mind and body were separate, interactional entities.
We may view these instances as metaphors to describe and understand consciousness (cf. Jaynes,
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1976). This process of conceptualizing consciousness as the Mind and Its processes continues
even today with the development of theories in psychology. Sigmund Freud (1915/1957) once
wrote regarding psychology as a field:
In psychology, we can only describe things by the help of analogies. There is nothing
peculiar about this; it is the case elsewhere as well. But we have constantly to keep
changing these analogies, for none of them lasts us long enough. (p. 195)
Leary (1990) posited that dating back to Plato (circa 355 BC), and possibly farther, metaphor
has been widely utilized as a guide for a way of thinking and knowing. In fact, Plato (as cited in
Leary, 1990) indicated that theories are “likely stories” that people use to understand their
world. Leary cites John Locke, “if we could trace them back to their sources, we should find, in
all languages, the names for things that fall not under our senses to have had their first rise from
sensible ideas” and that “sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse signification, and made
to stand for ideas that come not under the cognizance of our senses” (p. 14)
People’s cognitions, emotions, and behaviors are prime examples of how humans
transform abstract ideas and concepts into something that resembles—and utilizes the language
of—the senses. The English words for cognition, emotion, and behavior have been derived from
Latin combinations that make a verb, or process, into a noun or thing. Cognition comes from the
Latin word cognitio(n) which is from the verb cognoscere, meaning to get to know (Cognition,
2011). Similarly, behavior is derived from be- (prefix) and have, meaning to have in a particular
way (Behavior, 2011). Emotion comes from the Latin combination of e- (variant of ex-) and
movere and means to move out and has been used in the sense of mental agitation and feelings
(Emotion, 2011). Again it has been helpful to transform processes, actions, and ways of being
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into nouns and things so as to convey substance. By creating a noun from a process, an
ontological metaphor is utilized.
Psychology has utilized a number of metaphors to describe discrete phenomena. For
example, Hoffman, Cochran, and Nead (1990) described the use of computer schematics and
programming as well as Helmholz’s and Descartes’ geometrical optics metaphor, which is
based on the human visual perception system. Sarbin (1990) detailed how even the term mental
illness, which means to become infirm of the mind, is in itself a metaphor. He went on to
describe how psychopathology (a metaphor) has been utilized to create medical or bodily
metaphors for aberrant behavior, including wandering wombs (hysteria), split minds
(schizophrenia), and premature dementia (dementia praecox) to provide a few. These
psychological phenomena became metaphors by their initial linguistic construction. However,
over time, these metaphors became reified and the metaphoric connotation was lost.
Theoretical paradigms work in a similar manner. The theoretician creates metaphors to
explain complex, and at times ineffable, human processes such as relational patterns, psychoses,
and volatile moods. Theoretical paradigms are constructed of metaphors to understand how to
work with these psychological processes and experiences. To elucidate, one can intervene to fix
cognitions that are faulty (mind-as-machine metaphor; cognitive-behavioral therapy), explore
repressed emotions to let them out (ontological metaphor; psychoanalytic theory), or
differentially reinforce behaviors to structurally change one’s particular way of being
(engineering [ontological] metaphor; behavioral therapy). As a result, theoretical paradigms are
composed of metaphors arranged in particular ways to understand the human experience, and
guide the therapeutic process. Yet, over time, these metaphors can become reified or
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conventional metaphors, whereby the frame no longer creates enough tension to decipher the
phrase as a metaphor.
The Link between Metaphors and Theoretical Paradigms
It has been explained what metaphors are and how they work. It has also been suggested
that theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors. At this point, it is necessary to analyze how
theoretical paradigms function as metaphors by first examining the basic tenets for metaphors
outlined in the previous chapter. (The tenets are reiterated below for ease of reference for the
discussion that follows.)
Metaphors are created through the relationship between a known (or better known)
construct (metaphier) and a lesser known construct (metaphrand).
These constructs are composed of systems, the vehicle (metaphier and paraphiers)
acting on the topic (metaphrand and paraphrands).
The relationship between the vehicle and the topic facilitates the meaning making
process by displacing attributes (e.g., images, concepts, and linguistic expressions) of
the better known construct onto the lesser known construct. Meaning paraphiers are
displaced onto the metaphrand, to create paraphrands.
Metaphors require a frame to create tension between the vehicle and topic to indicate
that the language is not to be understood literally but metaphorically.
The salience of the metaphor can be understood in terms of the degree of
displacement of the paraphiers as expressed in the equation N Px α S Metaphor .
Over time, metaphors become conventional modes of linguistic expression and may
not appear as metaphors at all.
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Metaphors can be socially constructed and understood through a phenomenological,
hermeneutic process.
Metaphors do not function like other linguistic tropes—metonymy, simile, and
analogy—in terms of semantic structure, which strengthens the relationship between
the vehicle and topic.
As indicated above in Tenet 1, theoretical paradigms create a relationship between what is a
construct, such as depression or personality, and what is better known, such as things, conflicts,
or engineering. While many theoretical paradigms draw on esoteric lexica that appear literal
(e.g., schema or superego), in fact, the bases of such lexica are grounded in metaphoric language.
Concepts may be understood in terms of machinery and engineering (faulty cognitions : faulty
mechanics) or human attributes (harsh superego : overbearing mother). In these instances, the
lesser known concept of depression with its network of associations (topic) is placed in a
relationship to machinery or a human characteristics with its network of associations (vehicle),
thus, creating the metaphor of the faulty cognition and schema, or superego. This relationship is
created within the frame of academia, clinical practice, and scholarly writings as described in
Tenet 4. One cannot see the mind or the processes that govern it, however, one can bear witness
to patterns of behaviors that can be conceptualized in terms of something more concrete. As
such, a frame has been created whereby tension exists between a human or a piece of machinery
(vehicle) and human behavior, emotions, and experiences (topic). This system of lexical
relationships satisfies Tenets 2 and 3. Also, with the displacement of associations from the
vehicle to the topic, one can understand, explain, and predict (to a reasonable degree) how an
individual may engage the world, making them salient to clinical work and research (cf. Tenet
5). Within this scope, the first five characteristics of metaphors are met by theoretical paradigms.
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As posited in Tenet 6, metaphors become conventional over time. Theoretical paradigms
work similarly whereby the use of the lexicon becomes more conventional and fluid. As
identified in Tenet 7, societal influences and individual interpretation—which is based on lived
experiences—create metaphors by placing one concept in relation to another. So too is the
process for creating Psychology’s various theoretical paradigms, which were created during
different time periods and in different cultures, such as 19th Century Austria or 20th Century
America. These cultures are sociohistorical contexts, which contained significant differences in
available knowledge (e.g., engineering, computing, medicine, physics), language, societal mores,
and educational focus. One can imagine the societal differences between these two places and
time as well as how those societies influenced their theoreticians. In order for a theoretician to
make his or her theory salient, that individual would have to develop the theory with a language
that is understood within that sociohistorical context. Tenet 7 emphasizes the social construction
of language and the process of meaning making. The metaphier utilized to form the metaphor
must be able to displace a high number of paraphiers onto the metaphrand. Thus, when creating a
metaphor, the metaphier must be salient and known to a society to create a meaningful metaphor.
During the creation of the metaphor, it is the social construction of language between the theorist
and society that influences what metaphier is chosen.
Simultaneously, during the development of a theory, the theorist is influenced by her or
his own images, associations, and thoughts, which are derived from her or his unique lived
experiences. The theorist incorporates what she or he already learned from the interpretation.
The theorist then attempts to convey those thoughts, conceptualizations, and experiences through
theory. This may manifest as a description of what has been helpful when working with patients
and the figurative language that the theorist found helpful to understand the patients’
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experiences. Essentially, the theorist is interpreting an experience in a clinical setting and
attempting to convey it through language so that others can learn from and interpret the theorist’s
conclusions. The theorist’s interpretation of her or his lived, clinical, and personal experiences is
a phenomenological hermeneutic process.
Social constructionism and phenomenology are both interfaces of two ontological and
epistemological frames. This interface permits both society and the individual a place in the
meaning making process. The relationship between the theorist and his or her society, within a
particular historical period becomes apparent, whereby the language, worldview, and general
knowledge within a society are propagated through discourse. The interpretation of this
discourse and other lived experiences influence the meaning derived from the discourse and, in
turn, influences future social dialogs. One’s interpretation and experiences influence social
interaction and dialog. Since influence is bidirectional, social interactions also influence how one
interprets experiences. Ultimately, this process manifests in the theorist’s lexicon and approach
to clinical work, which convey the sociohistorical vernacular, general societal knowledge,
cultural mores, as well as the theorist’s idiographic associations, experiences, and interpretative
processes. These writings are then available for interpretation by the reader in his or her own
sociohistorical context.
Individuals interpreting the writings of the theoretician have idiosyncratic associations to
the figurative and evocative use of language. Consider that a theoretical paradigm may resonate
with one person but not another. Although the language and meaning is understood between
student/clinician and the theoretician (a social construction), its utility is constructed at the
individual level and can include the student’s/clinician’s associations and concordance with lived
experiences (a phenomenological hermeneutic). Within this scope, the seventh tenet is satisfied
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by theoretical paradigms. Last, and possibly most visible, is that theoretical paradigms do not
function like other linguistic tropes. To elucidate, a theoretical paradigm does not imply that
depression, for instance, is like (simile), or analogous to (analogy), or represents part of
(metonymy) a theoretical construct. Although theoretical constructs may appear literal, they are
in fact not veridical. Consider that all theoretical constructs merely approximate their respective
phenomena, which can be understood based on the number of paraphiers displaced onto the
metaphrand. As such, it can be seen that the final characteristic of metaphors is applicable to
theoretical paradigms.
Within this purview, it can be seen that theoretical paradigms rely on metaphors to
explain human phenomena. However, within it can also be seen that theoretical paradigms serve
as a metaphor for how a clinician understands the world. This metaphor is then utilized in
therapy to provide coherence and meaning for both patient and clinician. What follows is an
understanding of how theoretical paradigms are composed of metaphors, how theoretical
paradigms serve as metaphors, and how these metaphors are utilized within the scope of praxis.
Composition of Theoretical Paradigms
In order to convey meaning, metaphors must describe one abstract concept in terms of
another more concrete construct. As noted earlier, metaphors convey meaning by forming a
relationship between the vehicle (metaphier and its network of paraphiers) and topic (metaphrand
and its network of paraphrands, including displaced paraphiers). Essentially, the meaning and
associations linked to a well-known concept (vehicle) are transferred to a lesser known concept
(topic). This process is complex when the scope of the metaphor is limited to one aspect of
human experience (e.g., love being a journey or debate being a war), however, when a metaphor
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is intended to serve as a functional representation of human experience, it must be well
structured given the plethora of experiential possibilities.
The philosophy of a theoretical paradigm—how one knows, learns, and views the
world—begins with its core metaphor because it sets the basis for the language that is utilized to
understand human experiences. For a metaphor to be a core metaphor, its paraphiers must be
displaced onto the other metaphors contained within the theory—or at the very least permit
congruence between the various metaphors. Consider a theoretical paradigm that makes the
ontological and epistemological assumptions in which experience and learning are rooted in the
relationships that exist between people. In this instance, the core metaphor is one of
personification.
A personification metaphor utilizes a person as the metaphier with people’s reactions,
interactions, experiences, and other human attributes serving as the paraphiers. This type of
metaphor lends itself to be congruent with other metaphors depending on the number of
paraphiers that its metaphier can displace onto the other metaphors’ metaphrands. For instance,
the personification metaphor lends itself to being congruent with other metaphors such as
container metaphors, war metaphors, and journey metaphors because the personification
metaphor shares paraphiers with these aforementioned metaphors as people can take up space,
engage in war, and go on a journey. These commonalities that create congruence between
metaphors are similar to the processes that create salience for a metaphor based on the
displacement of paraphiers from the metaphier onto the metaphrand. A personification metaphor
may not be as congruent with a mind-as-machine metaphor when compared to a container
metaphor.
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If the mind is a machine, where is the person who would be working on the machine? In
what space would that person reside? Would such a space exist outside of the mind and, if so,
what would such a space be called? What would ultimately result would be that the person and
the machine would be housed in the same place; however, the mind is no longer a machine but a
warehouse (or a workshop, mechanic shop, laboratory, etc.). Here, it is important to understand
that while a theory could be developed using people and machinery to conceptualize the mind,
additional metaphors would need to be utilized to be coherent.
Within the context of a theoretical paradigm, these metaphors—which can convey
meaning about depression, grief, anxiety, anger, and behaviors to provide a few—must be
congruent or the theory itself would be disjointed. Consider the following example. If a
theoretical paradigm utilized the metaphor of a life is a journey (cf. Lakoff & Johnson, 2003), the
lack of coherence would be problematic across different contexts. While a journey may be a
salient metaphor for love, the number of paraphiers displaced onto the metaphrand (love) is high,
it is less salient for anxiety. The number of paraphiers that a journey can displace on the
metaphrand love is likely higher than it can displace on anxiety.
In this sense, a theoretical paradigm is unique in its construction because its core
metaphor, mind-as-a-machine metaphor or personification metaphor for instance, permits
congruence with other metaphors. Furthermore, theoretical paradigms are organized more
complexly than many conventional metaphors. To elucidate, a theoretical paradigm can explain
multiple experiences, such as love, anger, depression, and anxiety. As such, rather than assigning
a single metaphor to various emotional and experiential states (i.e., love is a journey), theoretical
paradigms utilize nested metaphors to extend the ontological and epistemological assumptions to
other metaphors in order to explain a multitude of experiences. For example, the id–ego–
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superego triad can be a metaphor for multiple psychological events, such as depression, anxiety,
or impulse control (cf. Chapter 3 for a more detailed example). It is this flexibility that is
afforded to theoretical paradigms that make them useful in clinical practice. As will be discussed
in the following section, these nested metaphors and the theoretical paradigm, which itself serves
as a metaphor, ground the clinician’s ontology with epistemological certitude.
Theoretical Paradigms Serve as Metaphors
While the theoretical paradigm’s evocative language can convey meaning about human
behavior, thought, and emotion, the theoretical paradigm itself serves as a metaphor for the
clinician. The figurative language of the clinician’s theoretical paradigm serves as symbol for his
or her epistemological assumptions of what therapy is and how that individual should interact in
therapy to effect meaningful change. This is related to the core metaphor of the theory. A
personification metaphor conveys that human interaction is at the fore of meaning making and,
consequently, guides the clinician to examine the patient’s past relationships and current modus
oparandi. This occurs because the coherence of the metaphor guides the clinician’s
understanding. If a psychological construct, such as depression, is personified, then the clinician
understands depression as someone with whom to interact. A clinician may interact with
depression directly (i.e., as a person) or indirectly (i.e., as a person born from in vivo
relationships). Conversely, a mind-as-machine metaphor yields a different understanding. A
machine can be fixed by swapping one part for another or by examining to see where the
machine malfunctions or breaks down. Rather than focusing on relationship between clinician
and patient, the clinician may be viewed as a mechanic of sorts, with tools that can be given to
the patient so that, consequently, the patient can maintain the machine in the future.
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As can be seen from these two brief examples, a clinician’s theoretical orientation serves
as a metaphor for how that individual thinks and makes meaning out of lived experiences. This
way of thinking and knowing, which is abstract by nature, is concretized by the theoretical
paradigm. Moreover, these theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors for conveying the
experience of a patient and the process of working with the patient to other mental health
professionals. By doing so, other mental health professionals can understand what is being
attended to and what is not being attended to in therapy, through a metaphoric shorthand. Rather
than explaining each interaction—thus recreating the therapeutic experience—the theory serves
as a metaphor for how the clinician tends to respond. Moreover, it yields an understanding of
what the quality of the interactions will be like and to what the clinician will, and will not
respond. Thus, the clinician can ascertain what is salient in order for therapy to be effective.
Metaphor as the Psychotherapy Object
With the metaphor in hand, the clinician can then utilize the metaphor to effect change.
This process, according to Sergio (2011), serves as an object with a particular function that
differs from other human relationships and interactions. The function of the psychotherapy
object is determined by the metaphor that the clinician utilizes and can be understood through
Peircean semiotics. Consider the following example. A patient walks in with a set of symptoms
or problems (Sign 1 ). This set of symptoms or problems symbolizes a particular psychological
process as explicated by the clinician’s theoretical orientation (Object 1 ). From the sign–object
relationship, the clinician generates meaning regarding deficits, strengths, and ways of
interacting (Interpretant 1 ). The clinician can create this meaning because that individual
understood the grammar, syntax, and structure of the writings outlining that theory (Immediate
Interpretant), as well as, the implications for what would be considered therapeutic for the patient
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(Dynamic Interpretant). By means of the interaction, the patient’s set of symptoms or problems
shift becoming exacerbated, ameliorated, or neither (remain static). This shift then becomes a
new sign (Sign 2 ), which is then placed in relation to the clinician’s theory (Object 2 ) and further
interpreted ad infinitum. For a graphical depiction of this process, see Figure 3.
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Figure 3. This process continues ad infinitum so that the interpretant becomes the next sign that
can be placed in relationship to an aspect of the theory. Sign n+1 will share some characteristics
with Sign n .
Now, consider within the context of the aforementioned example how different
theoretical paradigms influence the therapeutic process. A theoretical paradigm that utilizes a
personification metaphor as its core metaphor will yield different interventions than one that
utilizes a mind-as-machine metaphor. That is, beyond the explicit examples provided in a
theoretician’s work (e.g., “I then said to the patient….”), the core metaphor implicates a way of
being with an individual. A personification metaphor may implicate dialog, argument,
observation, and other human attributes to a psychological process—the processes that cause an
individual to feel depressed. As such, the clinician then responds in a way that is different from
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these internal psychological processes so as to help effect change. This process is informed by
the interpretant, which in itself stems from the sign–object relationship.
Differentiation of the Metaphor and Peircean Triads
One may notice that both metaphors and Peircean semiotics utilize a triadic relationship
at the center of meaning making. The vehicle–topic relationship, which yields the metaphor,
seems quite analogous, even interchangeable, to the sign–object relationship, which yields the
interpretant. The delineation in the language, however, is drawn not along functional lines—as
both generate meaning and understanding through a relationship—but, rather, along process
lines. Metaphors are created through a relationship of comparisons and displacement, in which
two constructs are related based on similarities and differences. Those similarities are displaced
onto the more abstract construct (metaphrand) to generate understanding. Conversely, the triadic
relationship between the sign, object, and interpretant, is based not on comparison and
displacement, but on representation and interpretation. More specifically, the sign serves as a
representation for the object, and this relationship then undergoes a hermeneutic process to yield
the interpretant. Moreover, the creation of a metaphor is a terminal event that ends with the
metaphor’s creation while the Peircean semiotic process is an event that continues ad infinitum.
Given these contrasts in process, it is important that one not be substituted for the other. It is
fitting that Sergio (2011) utilized the phrase “psychotherapy object.” The theoretical paradigm
serves as the object within the scope of Peircean semiotics and aligns with the processes
described earlier of creating nouns from verbs and ways of being. This is because processes may
be understood more readily when they are transformed into objects, which can be structured and
built using metaphors.
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Chapter Summary
As can be seen, theoretical paradigms are composed of metaphors, which make tangible
various aspects of the human experience by placing them in relation to some concept, which is
already known. The metaphor accomplishes this by displacing attributes on the better known
concepts (vehicle) onto aspects of the human experience, which are not as well understood
(topic). This process occurs within the field of psychology (frame), with the metaphors changing
over time (socially constructed). As time passes, however, these metaphors are viewed as
veridical constructs rather than metaphors for human experience and one’s way of thinking.
These metaphors are interpreted and understood differently from individual to individual. Thus,
returning to the eight characteristics of metaphors that were postulated earlier, theoretical
paradigms can be explained in the following ways.
Theoretical paradigms are created through the relationship between a known (or
better known) construct (metaphier) and a lesser known construct (metaphrand).
These constructs are composed of systems, the vehicle (metaphier and paraphiers)
acting on the topic (metaphrand and paraphrands).
The relationship between the vehicle and the topic, ultimately, facilitates the meaning
making process by displacing attributes (e.g., images, concepts, and linguistic
expressions) of the better known construct onto the lesser known construct. That is,
paraphiers are displaced onto the metaphrand to create paraphrands.
Theoretical paradigms require a frame to create tension between the vehicle and topic
so as to indicate that the language is not to be understood literally but metaphorically.
The salience of a theoretical paradigm can be understood in terms of the degree of
displacement of the paraphiers as expressed in the equation N Px S Metaphor .
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Over time, theoretical paradigms become conventional modes of linguistic expression
and may not appear as metaphors at all.
Theoretical paradigms can be socially constructed and understood through a
phenomenological, hermeneutic process.
Theoretical paradigms do not function as other linguistic tropes—metonymy, simile, and
analogy—in terms of semantic structure, which strengthens the relationship between the vehicle
and topic.
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Chapter 3

This chapter elucidates how theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors by utilizing a case
example. In the case example, the linguistic concepts mentioned heretofore will be applied to
psychoanalytic theory and will delineate a process for applying this meta-theory. Once an
understanding of how theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors, the use of the metaphor in the
therapeutic context will be explicated by Peircean semiotics.
Psychoanalysis: An Overview
First, it is important to reiterate that the creation of metaphors occur within a
sociohistorical context with their meaning further refined by a phenomenological hermeneutic
process. In the case example of psychoanalysis, 19th Century Austria is the sociohistorical
context. This sociohistorical context affects the values, language, and the creation of
psychoanalysis. Peter Gay’s (1989a) book, Freud: A Life for Our Time can serve as a more
complete reference to the time period of Freud. 4 The objective of the following section is to
create a context in which psychoanalytic theory was developed, providing a foundation for
understanding its metaphors.
A condensed history of the development of psychoanalysis. Freud lived in Austria
during the late 19th Century and early 20th Century after emigrating from the Czech Republic at
the age of 4 (Pickren & Rutherford, 2010). According to Pickren and Rutherford, Freud had a
voracious intellectual appetite and had a fondness for history, literature, and philosophy. His
interest, spawned from archaeology and ancient heroes, including Moses and Hannibal (Mitchell
& Black, 1995). Jones (1953) stated that, being a young Jew in Vienna, Freud had limited
options in terms of career and schooling. Essentially, he was limited to business, law, or
4

For the purpose of this present research, inordinate historical details will not be provided regarding Freud or
psychoanalysis. That is, the present research merely presents detail pertinent to the development of psychoanalysis’s
language.
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medicine. Following gymnasium 5, Freud chose to pursue a career in medicine at the University
of Vienna, which was fraught with anti-Semitism (Jones, 1953). During his studies at the
University of Vienna, Freud developed an interest in the writings of Brentano, who was
considered the founder of act psychology. It should be noted that act psychology is a discipline
of psychology that is focused on the experience of an activity rather than the structure of it
(Athabasca University, 2010). As such, Brentano’s theory of mental phenomena focused on
presentations, judgments, and love and hate (Huemer, 2010). For Freud, this burgeoning interest
in the mind would fully surface in the years following his attainment of a medical degree.
Freud graduated medical school with a strong understanding of the brain’s structure and
function (Mitchell & Black, 1995). Freud’s interest ultimately shifted completely from the brain
to the mind after he earned a six-month fellowship with Charcot, who would place individuals
with glove anesthesia 6 into hypnotic trances. The authors explain that Freud’s intrigue in the
domain of thought and motivation became fully evident at this point and that his varied interests
(e.g., history, archaeology, war/conflict, and literature) would serve as the foundation for
psychoanalysis. Freud’s office came to resemble a museum of relics and artifacts from ancient
civilizations.
As outlined by Mitchell and Black (1995), as well as Pickner and Rutherford (2010),
Freud gradually moved from a topographical theory (unconscious, preconscious, conscious) to a
structural theory (id, ego, superego), as a means to explain intrapsychic conflict, mental
processes, motivation, and symptom development. These incremental developments in Freud’s
theory and conceptualizations were wrought over time and based in his own experiences with
patients as well as dialog with colleagues and friends (Mitchell & Black, 1995; Pickner &
5

Gymnasium in many European countries is roughly equivalent to high school in the United States.
A phenomenon characterized by partial or absent sensation in one’s hand—as if wearing a glove—without the
presence of neurological damage (Mitchell & Black, 1995).
6
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Rutherford, 2010). Each new development in Freud’s theory attempted to capture an
understanding of human nature through the use of terms such as drive, instinct, energy, pressure,
and conflict, which were integrated into both the topographical and structural theories (Pickner &
Rutherford, 2010). Freud sought to understand the origins of human sexuality and how
developmental perceptions influence the experience of sexuality. This, for instance, can be seen
in Freud’s notion of the Oedipal complex, which was based on Sophocles’s story Oedipus Rex
and can be understood as one child’s destiny to follow his or her desires, resulting in a passionate
drama to possess the parent of the opposite sex while outcompeting the parent of the same sex;
childhood sexuality becomes organized during this period and the complex is resolved ultimately
through castration anxiety leading the child to reidentify with the parent of the same sex
(Mitchell & Black, 1995)
Freud developed these ideas, concepts, and theories all while living in Vienna—in fact,
Freud refused to leave Vienna even under threat of Nazi occupation (Pickner & Rutherford,
2010). Only in 1938 did Freud leave Vienna for London, where he died approximately one year
later from cancer of the jaw (Pickner & Rutherford, 2010). Mitchell and Black (1995) described
how Freud attempted to regulate psychoanalysis, which resulted in colleagues isolating him, only
to have their language reemerge in Freud’s writings later. Overall, the French clinical tradition,
philosophy, history, archaeology, neurology, and Freud’s own colleagues significantly
influenced his thinking.
Psychoanalytic theory: Concepts and formulation. For the purpose of this research,
Freud’s structural theory was utilized. Mitchell and Black (1995) explained that conflict is at the
center of Freud’s structural theory. Freud (1923/1960) contested that there are three psychical
strata referred to as the (a) conscious, (b) preconscious, and (c) unconscious. He indicated that
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the conscious is composed of what one is aware of, the preconscious is composed of what one is
not aware of but can become aware of, and the unconscious is that which is latently repressed.
What is important to note is that Freud described the preconscious as unconscious only
descriptively but not dynamically, thus, one is not aware of what is in the preconscious or the
unconscious; however, that which is in the preconscious is not repressed.
From this, three structures within the psyche are proposed to exist, (a) the id, (b) the ego,
and (c) the superego. The id, ego, and superego are in relative contact with one another, with the
id being entirely repressed and located inferior to the ego, which enters both the preconscious
and unconscious realms, while the superego reaches down into the id and extends up into the
conscious (Freud, 1899/2010; 1923/1960). Figure 4 shows Freud’s depiction of the id, ego, and
superego.
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Figure 4. Freud’s (1932/2010) depiction of his structural theory in The Anatomy of the Mental
Personality (recreated by the author of this study). That which is farthest from the perceptualconscious is farthest from one’s level of awareness. As such, the id is farthest from awareness
while the ego and superego are closer (or are in) the conscious.
Briefly put, Freud (1923/1960) described the id as that which is comprised of needs and
desires, as well as that which communicates the repressed, to the ego. While the id is ruled by
passions, the ego is ruled by reason (Freud, 1923/1960). Finally, Freud extrapolated that the
superego with its nascent development occurred early in life as the energetic reaction against the
id, and its ultimate development being heir to the Oedipus complex. 7

7

Note that, although no direct quotations were utilized from Freud, the author of this study utilizes the language of
psychoanalytic theory. This is intentional to convey Freud’s evocative language. Moreover, it sets the foundation for
the types of metaphors that pervade psychoanalytic theory.
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Psychoanalytic Theory and Its Metaphors
The metaphors that constitute psychoanalytic theory are what guide the process of
clinical work. For the purpose of this research, the structural model of psychoanalysis was
analyzed and its constituent metaphors were highlighted. The analysis commenced with the
identification of the core metaphor of psychoanalytic theory and culminated with the
identification of the various metaphors and how they nested together. Finally, a description of
how the content of the metaphors was influenced by socially constructed and phenomenological
processes is provided in particular reference to the vehicle of the metaphor.
The core metaphor: Ontology of the mind. Psychoanalytic theory postulates that the
mind exists. Despite Freud’s positivist influences in medical school and understanding of
physiology and neurology, Peter Gay (1989b) and Mitchell and Black (1995) explained that
Freud increasingly utilized psychological language to describe psychological phenomena. For
this reason, the implicit metaphor that permits the existence of all other metaphors utilized in
psychoanalysis, is the ontological metaphor of the mind. Without it, the conceptualization of the
id, ego, superego, conscious, unconscious, preconscious, and instincts (Eros and Thanatos) could
not exist. Thus, the ontological metaphor of the mind is the core metaphor in psychoanalytic
theory.
Jaynes (1976) explained that dating back to Antiquity the mind has been described
metaphorically as an entity. For instance, the word psyche is defined as the soul or the word
thumos is defined as the emotional soul. In both of Jaynes’s examples, the mind or one’s
consciousness has an existence or substance. Regardless of whether a dualist or monist
perspective on the mind is taken—the mind and body are separate or that the mind is a function
of the brain, respectively—it is conceptually useful to describe the mind as a noun. If the mind is,
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indeed, separate from the body, it is an experience that needs to be placed into language. As a
result, it is described as something that embodies one’s personality, experiences, and memories.
If the mind is, indeed, a function of the brain, it is difficult to conceptualize how it interacts with
a set of firing neurons. This interaction, thus, must occur with something that is better known or
more readily understandable. In either case, a metaphor must be created.
Freud does not depart from this process of conceptualizing a mind. All of Freud’s
concepts take place within a mind. The unconscious, drives, and structures that pervade
psychoanalytic thought do not reside physically within the brain, nor were Freud’s works
describing exacting experiments to locate personality or other “structures” within the brain itself.
As illustrated in Figure 4, Freud’s conception of the mind was that of a physical, though
indistinguishable entity. If one considers that the mind is now the topic and a physical entity is
the vehicle (cf. Chapter 1 for definitions), the associations that one has to something physical can
include the mind as something with which to be interacted, something that can be molded,
something that can be held, something that can be looked into, something that can change over
time, or something that is composed of any combination of the aforementioned. These
associations (paraphiers) are displaced onto the mind, which makes the concept of the mind
tangible. This, when created within the frame of psychological science, presents the mind as
something that can be studied.
The mind as a container. The personification metaphor is based on Freud’s structural
theory of the mind, but it relies on its predecessor, the topographical theory of mind. Freud, in
his early writings, delineated the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious, which are
constructed to serve as repositories for thoughts and drives. The id resides primarily within the
unconscious, the ego predominately in the conscious, and the superego residing primarily within

THEORY AS METAPHOR

55

the unconscious but also the preconscious (Freud, 1923/1960; Gay, 1989b; Mitchell & Black,
1995). As a result, the personified entities of the id, ego, and superego exist within a space,
which requires the use of a container metaphor. Thus, the container is essential for “psychic life”
to exist.
As a container, the mind or psyche can receive projections from the patient, introject
them, or serve as a holding space. The terms transference, countertransference, and projection
each constitute a process by which a personified mind (the unconscious) projects or evokes
something in the other. The unconscious receives these projections and take up space within the
other. As can be seen here, the container metaphor permits for things to be held or contained
when there is room, but can be overfilled as well, leading to a lack of containment or holding.
A container, which in this metaphor is the vehicle, is placed in relation to the psyche, in
which there is a conscious, unconscious, and preconscious. Containers have volume whereby
things can be placed closer to the surface, in plain sight of an individual looking in, or buried at
the bottom out of plain sight, and potentially out of complete awareness that something is there
at all. Similarly, large containers have less light reaching the bottom than the top of the
container. All of these are suitable paraphiers for displacement onto the metaphrand. This works
in conjunction with the orientational metaphor of the mind, which is discussed next.
The orientation of the mind. Freud’s use of what Lakoff and Johnson (2003) termed a
conventional orientation metaphor of consciousness is readily apparent. That is, consciousness is
oriented as up while unconscious is oriented down. Moreover, reason and logic (the role of the
ego) are oriented up and emotion and impulse (what drives the id) are oriented down. Freud
(1923/1960) describes how the superego dips down into the unconscious and that the ego, which
is based in reality and associated with judgment and reason are located higher, near the surface.

THEORY AS METAPHOR

56

Even the location of the superego/Über-ich is located above the ego/ich in terms of linguistic
usage.

8

In this case, the mind is oriented in such a way that is coherent with the container
metaphor. Finding what has been hidden at the bottom of the container requires one to go down
into the depths of the container. The paraphiers of down include dark and hidden, or emotional
and irrational within the conventional orientational metaphors. Freud’s use of such language
permits a high displacement of paraphiers onto the metaphrand. Even those who may disagree
with psychoanalysis completely can understand the phrase “Look deep down inside yourself”;
maybe in reference to finding something that they wanted to keep from other people. This is in
complete accord with the container and orientational metaphors utilized in psychoanalysis to
describe the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious as well as moralistic standards and
deviant impulses and desires.
Personification of experience. However, within psychoanalytic thought conflict serves
as one of the central tenets. Consider how individuals feel conflicted about decisions that they
make. Feeling conflicted is unpleasant because one may know what they want to do, what they
should do, and how the actually could do it. Lakoff and Johnson (2003) described that the
conventional metaphor of argument is war. That is, one defends his or her position, shoots down
other arguments, take sides to an argument, and attempts to destroy the opposing view. One can
even argue (wage war) with oneself, and as such, the individual may feel conflicted or defeated.
Yet, conceptually, war is a predominately human development. Things and objects do not wage
war and rarely are animals described as engaging in war. From this understanding of conflict and
human experience, the meaning can be extended to psychoanalytic theory.

8

The terms ich, über-ich, and (later) es are German words that translate into I, above I, and it, which correspond to
the Latin translation of ego, superego, and id, respectively.
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Freud’s development of the id, ego, and superego personify the mental experiences of
conflict, which relies on creating human-like conceptions. The id embodies those basic instincts
and pleasure-oriented activities; the superego embodies what one “knows” is right and just; and
the ego mediates a war on two fronts: between the id and the superego, and between what is
happening internally with what is reasonable and possible externally. This is the first step in
understanding how theoretical paradigms serve as metaphors. The id, ego, and superego are
personified metaphors which were described in Freud’s (1923/1960) The Ego and the Id as Das
Es (the it), Das Ich (the I), and Das Über-ich (the above I) and translated later using the Latin
words id, ego, and superego, meaning it, I, and above I, respectively. 9 These entities can engage
in humanesque behavior whereby they are the subject of verbs (i.e., “…the ego is in the habit of
transforming the id’s will into action as if it were its own” [Freud, 1923/1960, p. 19]) and can be
described as functioning independently of a machine (i.e., the ego is not a program that is run or
a reflex that occurs in response to a stimulus).
As such, the id, ego, and superego serve as the vehicle for an individual’s psychological
processes. However, consider that vehicle is something that is generally well known and can
displace paraphiers onto the metaphrand of the vehicle. In this case, it is the evocative language
that is utilized by Freud that permits the id, ego, and superego to be vehicles. The rich
descriptions of each of these entities provide narratives, thus, creating characters like in a play.
These “characters” can then be utilized to help the clinician understand that which is unknown
about the patient.
Also, consider the lexical use in Freud’s original, untranslated work. There was a clear
reference to the self in regards to the I and the above I; those aspects that are rational (ego) and
moral (superego) in the individual, but the impulse-driven, pleasuring-seeking entity of the it (id)
9
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is a differentiated, vulgar entity. More specifically, the positive aspects are referenced by the
word I, while the vile attributes are referenced by a non-descriptive thing, the it. Thus, during
Freud’s time, the paraphiers that would be displaced would likely be very different than those in
modern America. For individuals who do not know Latin, the initial meaning would be lost in
the translation. This exemplifies a shift in the linguistic frame of the metaphor. While, regardless
of the translation of Freud’s work, the characteristics of the id, ego, and superego are detailed in
a poetic and evocative manner. However, the amount of tension that exists may lessen, whereby
the metaphor potentially becomes less apparent.
War and the conflict of the mind. This tripartite configuration personifies experiences
and urges of an individual. That is, an individual may have the experience of wanting to do
something while knowing that it is considered wrong and, ultimately, must negotiate between
what may feel right and what is socially proscribed. This internal struggle and the ensuing
distress is part of the next discussed metaphor: the structural metaphor of war. As outlined by
Mitchell and Black (1995), Freud was interested in anthropology and archaeology, of which war
is a part. Consider that the ego must utilize defenses to protect against the unconscious onslaught
of the id. Freud (1923/1960) stated that the ego must “…fend them off [the object-cathexes] by
the process of repression” (p. 23). He also indicated the ego must “ [take] on a hostile coloring”
(p. 27) or that the infantile ego may fortify itself. A final example, which clearly makes the link
to the war metaphor is actually created by a simile in Freud’s writings. Freud (1923/1960)
contested,
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The struggle which once raged in the deepest strata of the mind, and was not brought to an
end by rapid sublimation and identification, is now continued in a higher region like the
Battle of the Huns in Kaulbach’s painting. (p. 36) 10
What should become increasingly evident is that the use of the war metaphor to structure the
conflicts between the id and superego, or external and internal worlds, is evocative but
metaphorical. (n.b., Freud likened the internal, experienced struggle to that of the Battle of the
Huns by way of simile. As outlined by Punter [2007], the use of simile makes the comparison
more evident than solely relying on metaphor but is still evocative.)
The experience of internal conflict serves as the topic, while the understanding of war
serves as the vehicle. The paraphiers that one may see as being displaced are associations to
battle, destructions, defenses, and attacking. Moreover, the notion that there can be a victor and a
loser, or a stalemate, is a salient paraphier for the experience of internal conflict. Consider that
the ego has a war on two fronts (a) the internal world–external world front, and (b) the id–
superego front. If the attacks on one, or both, fronts are of such magnitude, the paraphier of
exhaustion, fear, or hypervigilance may be displaced from the two-front war to the id–ego–
superego conflict.
The nested metaphors of psychoanalysis. Based on what has been discussed heretofore,
the primary metaphors utilized in psychoanalytic thought include (a) the ontological metaphor of
the mind, (b) the personification metaphor of the structures (id, ego, and superego), (c) the
conventional metaphor of debate and conflict as war, (d) the conventional container metaphor of
the conscious, preconscious, and unconscious, and (e) the conventional orientational metaphor of
consciousness/reason as up and unconscious/subconscious/emotion as down. This can be
illustrated utilizing the structure of nested metaphors, as seen in Figure 5.
10
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Figure 5. Depicts the nested metaphors of psychoanalytic theory’s structural model. The
Ontological Metaphor is the core metaphor because it creates a world for the id, ego, superego,
conscious, preconscious, and unconscious to exist in.
One may ask, “Why have nested metaphors?” Each metaphor provided above serves a
purpose to convey an aspect of human experience or understanding. Without a conceptualization
of the mind and its capacity to contain, there can be no id, ego, or superego to reside within it.
Similarly, without the orientational metaphor, the above I (superego) would be illogical or
incongruent with other conceptualizations. Moreover, structures—as in Freud’s structural
theory—are oriented in at least two directions. It is no coincidence that the emotional, urge
driven id is placed below the moral-driven superego.
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What is also important is the fact that these nested metaphors are coherent with one
another. Rather than using five separate metaphors to describe various aspects of the human
experience (e.g., love is a journey, but the mind is a machine), a theory—in this case,
psychoanalysis—is comprised of language that permits coherence amongst its metaphors. This is
in contrast to simply using a metaphor in therapy (e.g., “Therapy is a journey. What might we
find along the way?”), or describing concepts through analogy or simile (e.g., “This part of the
brain is analogous to the hard drive on a computer”). The use of language within Freud’s
writings set a linguistic frame to interpret the language metaphorically. For instance, it is known
that there is no physical part within the body identified as the mind, nor is there a structure
known as the superego. It is acknowledged, that certain brain structures (i.e., pineal gland) had
previously been considered the interface of the mind and body. However, at the present time, the
brain is understood as a complex interaction of systems (Carlson, 2010). What will be described
in the next section is how understanding the sociohistorical context of Freud’s time, as well as,
Freud’s own lived experiences creates a frame to understand how his theory is comprised of
metaphors. Moreover, it will illuminate the actual content of the metaphors utilized within
psychoanalysis.
The Use of the Psychotherapeutic Object: Psychoanalysis as a Metaphor
It should be noted here that the term object is purposely used in this section to describe
Peirce’s semiotic process of interpretation. The reader may recall that the object in Peircean
semiotics is something that is represented by a sign or symbol. It is, in essence, the existence of
something that is represented by something else (the sign). One must consider, however, that the
term object also serves as an ontological metaphor. While a molehill may be a sign for the object
of a mole and tears may be a sign for the object of depression, the two differ in terms of the
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physicality. A mole possesses mass and takes up space. Depression, conversely, is an experience,
and experiences do not possess physical mass. And, even though depression can be understood in
terms of the physical attributes of neurobiology, chemistry, and physics, it is the product of these
interactions rather then the sole existence of them.
As explained by Sergio (2011), psychotherapy is viewed as an object to effect change.
Essentially, the process of psychotherapy is also a metaphor. And while this process can be
analyzed based on the clinician’s interventions or the content of the patient’s speech, the process
for what causes the change cannot be put to simple language. Rather, the theory is invoked to
convey to the clinician and to others what produced change. A patient may, for instance,
evidence greater ego capacity, which may be explained by developing insight into the origins of
the harsh, internal criticisms of the superego. Based on the presenting issues of the patient, the
clinician may choose to intervene in specific ways so that the patient can develop greater ego
capacity.
It is at this point of identifying issues and defining relevant interventions that the theory
serves as a metaphor. This should be differentiated from the theory being comprised of
metaphors. In the latter, the theory itself is comprised of the nested metaphors that are coherent
and convey experience. In the former, the theory is a way of understanding human experience
with the nuances that a clinician chooses to engage with the patient, to effect change. As such, a
dynamic process emerges whereby the clinician utilizes the theory as a metaphor, to guide the
psychotherapeutic process.
This dynamic process can be understood through Peircean semiotics. The clinician
engages in a hermeneutic process whereby that individual must interpret the signs and language
of the patient to inform how that individual should respond. What guides the intervention is the
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response of the patient and the clinician’s countertransference. In the latter, the clinician attempts
to interpret, and make meaning from his or her associations to the patient’s verbal and non-verbal
responses. Here, for instance, the metaphor of psychoanalysis permits a personified entity (i.e.,
the unconscious) to actively move a feeling, image, or otherwise from one person into another. In
the former, the clinician interprets the patient’s responses and thought processes with the
language and meaning of psychoanalysis in mind.
Being guided by the metaphor of psychoanalysis, the clinician understands human
existence as a constellation of experiences, of which one is aware of only some. The rest are
beyond one’s awareness and steeped in morality and impulse, as dictated by the superego and the
id. (n.b., That to be beyond awareness is congruent with the orientational metaphor.) The theory
is, therefore, an object such as a lens, through which the clinician views the world. As an object
of ontology and epistemology, psychoanalysis is no longer just composed of metaphors (e.g.,
ontological metaphor of the mind, mind as container, personification metaphor, war metaphor,
and orientational metaphor), but serves as a metaphor for the process of therapy and the
experience of the human condition. That is, it is a way of predicting and judging how a clinician
is to respond in therapy. It similarly serves as a means to understand the external sociohistorical
context in which one lives and the internal phenomenological experiences of being human.
Figure 6 depicts how psychoanalysis serves as a metaphor for the psychotherapeutic
process. Note that this may best serve as an oversimplification, but an appropriate approximation
of the process of psychotherapy. Consider that this process continues ad infinitum and that each
sign, object, and interpretant is influenced by those that preceded them. That is, interpretation
does not occur in a vacuum.
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Figure 6. A depiction of how the metaphor of psychoanalysis serves as an object in
psychotherapy with someone who experiences depression and guilt. While the process ends with
Sign 2 , it is one that continues ad infinitum, whereby Sign 2 will serve as a sign for Object 2 and
lead to a new interpretant (Interpretant 2 ). Note that Object 2 and Interpretant 2 (as well as all
subsequent sings, objects and interpretants) are not depicted in the figure for the sake of
simplicity but follows the same process beginning with Sign 1 . The * denotes the following
passage from Freud (1923/1960), “The superego retains the character of the father, while the
more powerful the Oedipus complex was and the more rapidly it succumbed to repression (under
the influence of authority, religious teaching, schooling and reading), the stricter will be the
domination of the superego over the ego later on—in the form of conscience or perhaps of an
unconscious sense of guilt” (p. 30). The figure represents the present understanding of how the
language reflects depressive symptoms.
What can be seen from the preceding example is how the clinician utilizes
psychoanalysis as an object of praxis. Stated differently, psychoanalysis serves as a lens through
which the clinician can see what must be attended to in the therapeutic relationship. It is
something that can be used to conceptualize cases, explain experience, understand how people
think and feel, predict reactions, and guide what to say and do. Even the phrase, psychoanalysis
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can be used to conceptualize cases, makes psychoanalysis a thing or object that can be used or
something that can effect change. Essentially, this transformation creates an ontological
metaphor. This ontological metaphor results from the synergy of its constituent, nested
metaphors.
Through a psychoanalytic lens, the human experience is viewed as dynamic where
conflict exists and pressures are exerted from opposing forces. The id, ego, and superego can be
interacted with as people, which is in contrast to other paradigms that presuppose a different
ontological assumption. The language that composes the theory—the vehicles and topics that are
placed in relation to one another to create the metaphors—guide how the object (psychoanalysis)
is utilized. People are not provided tools so that they can repair their mind (e.g., relaxation
techniques, cognitive restructuring techniques, or coping skills), because there is no mind-asmachine metaphor. Rather, people explore the container of the mind to see what can be
uncovered (italics added to emphasize the personification, container, and orientational metaphors
of psychoanalysis). Thus, when a clinician utilizes psychoanalysis, that individual will
understand a patient’s problems differently than if that individual utilized another theoretical
paradigm. The language that is utilized to create the metaphors governs these processes of
meaning making, interpretation, and intervention.
The Language of Psychoanalysis’s Metaphors
Now that it has been established that psychoanalysis is comprised of multiple, nested
metaphors, and that the theory itself serves as a metaphor for understanding and interpreting the
world, it is important to understand the linguistic content of the metaphors. Freud’s use of
language stemmed from his lived experiences and shared meaning making processes. Both
Mitchell and Black (1995) and Pickner and Rutherford (2010) illustrated the various influences
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of Freud’s thinking and the theory of psychoanalysis. The language and concepts generated
during the development of psychoanalysis undoubtedly had a significant effect on how
psychoanalysis was applied to praxis. Meaning making and interpretation are at the epicenter of
how theories serve as metaphors, whether it is the free associative process that emerged from
Freud observing Charcot placing individuals into hypnotic trances, or the understanding of how
symptoms manifested from an internal conflict, influencing what a clinician will address. As
illuminated by Mitchell and Black, “New language is sometimes invented to convey old ideas, so
that differences can be exaggerated in claims to originality. Old language is sometimes stretched
to convey new ideas, so that similarities can be exaggerated in claims to continuity” (p. xxi).
The historical context: Europe in the 19th Century. Beginning in the 1850s, there was
a political and social resurgence of conservative values dubbed the New Conservativism by
Rapport (2005). As described by the author, Europe was in the midst of social and economic
change from mid to late 19th century. This period was fraught with conflict as nation states were
unified and divided. Moreover, there was internal conflict within nations between liberal and
conservative political parties (Rapport, 2005). Rapport explained that much of Europe was
battling with identity. The Catholic Church, for instance, wished to spread its influence over
Europe while opposition groups espoused secularism and socialism. What was considered moral
was in flux, and the freedom of the individual was weighed against the traditions and prosperity
of the society.
Within Freud’s Czech Republic, there was internal strife between Jews and non-Jews,
which may have been one of the reasons that governed his family’s emigration from the Czech
Republic to Austria (Jones, 1953). Yet, even in Vienna, anti-Semitism reigned and limits were
placed on what people of different ancestral heritages could study in school and do for work
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(Jones, 1953). Literacy and education were becoming available to the European populace and the
emergence of mass politics—the integration of rural communities into national policy—served
as a fulcrum for societal change (Rapport, 2005). Moreover, disposable income was increasing in
Europe and this provided individuals with more leisure time for reading, joining trade groups,
and becoming active in political parties; ultimately creating greater social differentiation
amongst societal classes and social interest groups (Rapport, 2005).
Rapport (2005) described that the emerging influence of steam power to propel trains and
boats served as a catalyst for Europe’s growth, as well as, for its demise (Rapport, 2005). That is,
while it facilitated economic expansion and mobility across the continent, so too did it facilitate
the development of powerful weapons which would be used in a number of conflicts. In 1914,
the Great War began. As described by British Foreign Minister (in Rapport, 2005), the build up
of arms prior to the Great War was on account of insecurity—an insecurity that ultimately led to
millions of casualties.
Similarly, a paradox emerged with sexuality in Victorian Vienna and elsewhere. While
there was some progress being made on account of feminism and more liberal political groups,
women in Austria were considered to be different from men and sexuality, despite its visibility,
was simultaneously hushed (Luft, 2009). As outlined by Luft (2009), medicine, literature, and
theatre tended to serve as the media for discourse on sexuality. Moreover, sexuality served as
one of the symbolic fundamental issues in Vienna to debate individual identity, reason, and
domination. It was believed that women were expected to be pure and chaste while men were
governed by natural urges and permitted to explore their sexual desires with other women
(Rapport, 2005).
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Nineteenth Century Europe and social constructionism. Victorian Europe was at war
both between countries, and within their own borders. Moreover, these internal conflicts were
seen in politics, religion, and sexuality. Within psychoanalysis, there is a contention between
good and evil that manifests as language becomes steeped in conflict, sexuality, and insecurity.
These constructions served to create meaning in the lives of individuals and were suitable
metaphiers to create metaphors. Similarly, psychoanalysis attempted to provide language to
make meaning out of these events. In essence, European policies, literature, and theatre provided
a shared language and set of worldviews that contributed to the meaning making processes in
psychoanalysis. Freud’s contributions in terms of his writings made this processes bidirectional,
allowing him to influence the societal norms.
Given the prominence of war, conflict, and nation building during Freud’s time, it is no
surprise that the metaphiers of psychoanalysis embody these domains. For instance the conflict
between id and superego—which creates the conventional war metaphor—is described in terms
of war. One wreaks havoc on the other with the ego available to mediate (cf. the conventional
metaphor of argument is war in Lakoff & Johnson, 2003). What was salient at the time was
conflict, which served as an apt metaphier because it could displace a higher number of
paraphiers onto the metaphrand, thus creating a salient metaphor so that others could make
meaning in their own, personal lives.
Similarly, the discursive exchange between Austrian society, Freud, and other
philosophers regarding sexuality formulated a socially constructed understanding of what sex
was, how it served individuals and society, and how individuals understood gender roles and sex.
The struggles from which societies were attempting to make meaning served to provide the
metaphiers for psychoanalytic theory. The psychosexual stages of development served as an
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interface for the medical community and the larger, Austrian society. These stages served as a
tool to make meaning out of the conflicting messages regarding sex. The moral view espoused
by the Church and conservatives are seen as embodied within the superego and the urges, and
experiences of individuals are seen as embodied within the id (i.e., “What I should do vs. what I
feel or want to do.”). Freud postulated that the harshness of the superego is governed in part by
the Church, one’s teachers, and one’s parents.
Amongst Freud’s colleagues, the discourse around psychoanalysis altered the metaphor.
Jung, being from Switzerland, and G. Stanley Hall, being from the United States, polemicized
Freud’s views but also altered them to fit their cultures (Gay, 1989a). According to Gay (1989a),
Jung broke with Freud because of the focus on sexuality. For Jung, this metaphor lacked salience
in that it did not capture his experience or that of his society. It was not just Jung, however, who
viewed the emphasis on sexuality as unnecessary. Adler was also critical of the role of sexuality
in psychoanalytic theory and proposed that “organ inferiority”—the handicap or disability for
which an individual attempts to compensate—and the psychological failure to compensate for
this inferiority was the aetiology for a neurosis (Gay, 1989a). Some of this, according to Gay,
can be attributed to Adler’s socialist values and interest in social work. Within the context of
social constructionism, the dialog around sexuality did not foster meaning and, as such, was
rejected by Adler.
Be it Adler, Jung, or any of Freud’s contemporaries, anyone reading Freud’s work
becomes engaged in a dialog with Freud. As such, the two (reader and author [Freud]) develop a
sense of meaning and understanding of the world through the language of psychoanalysis. Over
time, the sociohistorical context changes for the reader and, thus, the language of psychoanalysis
is understood differently. While there are countless more examples of how dialog and meaning
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making within psychoanalytic circles and other societies led to alterations in psychoanalytic
work, the aforementioned examples are intended to elucidate this process. The society and era in
which a theory is created influences what metaphiers will be utilized. In the case of
psychoanalysis, conflict, sexuality, inferiority, and war are most prominent.
Simultaneously, phenomenological processes worked in parallel with those socially
constructed processes described above. It is the synergy of these two ontological and
epistemological processes that result in alterations to any theory and, more saliently, altered the
metaphiers of a theory.
Freud’s lived experiences. According to Jones (1954), Freud had a voracious interest in
literature, language, and anthropology. He read much of the works of Shakespeare and marveled
at the power of evocative language and prose. A particularly salient piece of literature was
Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex, which served as a prominent metaphier in psychoanalysis. Jones also
described Freud’s fluency in Latin and Greek as well as English, French, Spanish, Italian, and
Hebrew. The capacity for language to carry experience was a keen interest of Freud’s (ibid.
Jones, 1954).
When Freud was approximately twelve years of age, Jones (1954) described an incident
during which Freud’s father had his fur hat knocked off of his head. The perpetrator screamed
“Jew!” which symbolized the anti-Semitism at the time. When Freud asked his father, “And what
did you do?” Freud’s father indicated that he simply picked up his hat and continued on. Jones
described how this lack of heroism disillusioned Freud about his father and, moreover, Freud
never viewed his father in the same light again.
Another personal account provided by Jones (1954) was that of Freud’s first love. Upon
returning to his birthplace at the age of 16—the only time that he had done so in his life—Freud
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fell in love with a girl name Gisela, a few years his junior. According to Jones, Freud fantasized
about being with this girl, despite the fact that he was too shy to express his feelings to her.
Freud desired to have remained in the Czech Republic so that he could have grown up to be a
strong and sturdy man, like Gisela’s brothers, and would have had the opportunity to marry this
girl. On account of this, Freud blamed his father for not affording him such an opportunity. This
story, according to Jones, was later associated with another love from childhood, Pauline (in
Manchester, England), his half-brother’s daughter. She rejected Freud’s advances when Freud
was 19 years old. Both of these love interests were transformative for Freud (Jones, 1954).
Although there are many more experiences, each of these lived experiences played an
important role in Freud’s life. Jones (1954) explains that they were instrumental in the
development of the Oedipus complex—a hallmark of psychoanalysis. Freud’s interpretation and
associations to Oedipus Rex, his interest in evocative language, his lack of admiration for his
father, and his feeling of being silenced and rejected by Gisela and Pauline all informed how
Freud viewed human development.
Phenomenology and the language of psychoanalysis. Freud’s own lived experiences
influenced how he derived meaning from the texts on philosophy and anthropology and then
duly influence how he would make meaning from other experiences and texts. As such, the texts
and literature that Freud read became something to which he could associate in subsequent
experiences and essentially fostered the language that he utilized when thinking and writing
about psychoanalytic theory.
Further, Freud’s contemporaries had their own phenomenological understanding of
Freud’s writing based on their own lived experiences. Their associations to Freud’s work varied,
leading them to develop a language that had more salience when viewed in terms of their lived
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experiences. Jung and Adler, for instance, rejected the notion that sexuality formed the
foundation of psychological development. Based on their own experiences, there were other
factors (e.g., “organ inferiority” in the case of Adler) that seemed more salient to how individuals
developed psychologically. Once Freud’s contemporaries created their own lexicon, Freud was
able to interpret and associate his work to theirs. Some of Freud’s contemporaries’ language
made it into his theory, similar to the language and experiences of anthropology, neurology,
history, sex, and war/conflict.
So while a shared sense of meaning making has occurred through socially constructed
processes, phenomenological processes led to idiosyncratic associations, spawning new forms of
meaning making. For instances, Jung and Adler developed different metaphiers to lend greater
salience to their metaphors. However, this was partially based on their dialog with Freud (either
through his works or in face-to-face conversations). One can see here how social constructionism
and phenomenology ebb and flow with one another to generate meaning about the world.
The French tradition, the clinical work in which Freud engaged, fostered his sense of
meaning making in the development of his theory. Freud’s clinical work with patients comprised
lived experiences to which he could associate. His interpretation of these lived experiences
influenced his theory, which in turn influenced his understanding of clinical work. As such, the
language of the theory needed to be adapted, to match these novel interpretations. Similarly,
Freud’s own experiences and interpretation of them influenced how he approached the clinical
encounter, or how he formulated his developing theory. Consider, for example, how Freud’s
interest in literature informed how he would create a language to explain the Oedipus complex,
which was also guided by his experiences with love and disappointment. The multitude of
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experiences that comprise one’s existence also implicates just how idiosyncratic a theory’s
metaphors may be.
Summary
As has been elucidated, Freud’s societal context and lived experiences are what molded
the psychoanalytic lexicon and may be exemplified by the meaning derived from the story of
Oedipus Rex by Freud in Victorian Europe to create one of the central tenets of psychoanalysis.
This was not the mere substitution of language to describe a concept, nor was it just an idea that
influenced Freud’s thinking. Rather, it was the meaning of Oedipus Rex that was placed into a
relationship with an experience of conflicted feelings about a child’s parents during adolescence.
That is, conflict arises between two separate yet related factions: unbeknownst determination
(dubbed as fate in the story of Oedipus Rex) and conscious will. Essentially, the meaning that
Freud derived from interacting with 19th Century Austria, influenced his understanding of lived
experiences (social constructionism), which in turn altered his views of engaging in and
interpreting the dialog with his peers and society (phenomenology). Figure 7 is a visual
representation that depicts this process.
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Figure 7. The top half of the figure depicts the dialog between Freud and society and the
influence that his interpretation of lived experiences, and language, has on discourse. Similarly,
the bottom half of the figure depicts the influence that the social dialog has on Freud’s
interpretation of lived experiences and the language that he utilized to understand those
experiences. Concisely put, the top half depicts the influence that Freud’s phenomenology had
on social constructionism, while the bottom half depicts the influence that Freud’s social
constructions has on his interpretation of lived experiences.
What is important to understand from this process is that the evocative language utilized
in psychoanalysis is duly influenced by the sociohistorical context in which Freud lived, as well
as, his interpretation of lived experiences. This process is not unique to psychoanalysis, but
relevant to all theoretical paradigms within psychology.
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Chapter 4

The purpose of this research was to explore how theoretical paradigms function as
metaphors. From this thesis, the following goals were addressed: (a) to examine the utility of
metaphors and how they function, (b) to explore how theoretical paradigms serve as complex
metaphors, (c) to develop a theory of theory based on the aforementioned research goals, (d) to
understand the implications for the application of theory in research and clinical practice, and (e)
to provide researchers with future directions for scholarly inquiry.
The Utility of a Meta-theory
One may wonder about the utility of having a theory about theoretical paradigms. In
essence, the meta-theory is merely its own set of metaphors to describe metaphors. For instance,
the use of nested metaphors, metaphiers and paraphiers (vehicle), metaphrands and metaphiers
(topic), interpretants, and objects all utilize an ontological metaphor to generate meaning. The
vehicle is merely a vehicle for a process of creating associations, which results in the ontological
metaphor. This meta-theory provides one way of understanding how clinicians understand and
work within the therapeutic context.
By understanding the ontological and epistemological assumptions that clinician’s posses
regarding their own theoretical orientation, clinicians can engage in more reflective practice, like
how they conceptualize their patients’ problems. The caveat is that while it is important for a
theoretical paradigm to have the capacity to predict how to engage a patient in order to alleviate
distress and foster insight into the patient’s own actions, to reify a theory is problematic. When
reified, the concepts of a theoretical paradigm, the nested metaphors and their resulting
interpretants, become viewed as active ingredients that produce therapeutic change.
Consequently, the reification of concepts leads to the analogy of psychotherapy as medication.
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However, when psychotherapies are compared, common factors and specific “active ingredients”
are examined in meta-analyses there are generally no differences in effectiveness. The various
theoretical paradigms and the common factors to psychotherapy contributed 11% to 42% of the
variance for outcome success (Ahn & Wampold, 2001; Lambert & Barley, 2004; Lambert &
Bergin, 1994; Stevens, Hynan, & Allen, 2000; Wampold et al., 1997). This research suggested
that the utility of understanding theories as metaphors facilitates the clinician to help the patient
make meaning, and allows the techniques or specific “active ingredients” to be governed by the
metaphoric language of the theory. Yet it is the experience of the therapeutic relationship that
contributes much of the variance in the aforementioned literature. As such, it is important to step
away from side-by-side comparisons and examine the experience of the patient to understand
what was helpful. Developing predetermined ways of interacting with human beings based on
the “active ingredient” of a theory is not only rigid but also fallacious. Rather, a theoretical
paradigm’s language likely guides the clinician on how to create new experiences for the patient,
with the patient in the service of alleviating and understanding distress.
It is important to understand the parallels of this meta-theory. This meta-theory provides
a process to understand how a clinician thinks, feels, and experiences the process of
psychotherapy. How the clinician views the world and views psychotherapy undoubtedly
influences what the clinician discusses with the patient, how the clinician engages the patient,
and what meaning is ultimately generated between the clinician and patient. By examining the
metaphors that comprise the theoretical paradigm and by understanding how the theory functions
within the therapeutic context, the clinician can develop an awareness of the limitations,
strengths, biases, and guiding processes of her or his theoretical paradigm of choice. Moreover, it
promotes clinicians to understand the influences that society and culture have on the
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development of theoretical paradigms. The biases of a culture can easily manifest in how a
theory is intended to function. However, by being immersed in the culture, the clinician can
become blinded to those biases.
For example, currently emerging theories may contain biases related to the medical
establishment, the reification of research (particularly randomized controlled trials [RTCs]), the
use of jargon steeped in computer processing, and the need to save money through the use of
time-limited approaches. Consider that Division 12 of the American Psychological Association
indicates that “Most therapies described [on the Division’s empirically supported treatments
registry] were studied in a particular type of scientific study: a randomized controlled trial.
Randomized controlled trials are used routinely in medical research to determine which therapies
for a given disorder are beneficial” (Division 12 of the American Psychological Association,
2012, § Scientific Standards For Testing Psychotherapies, para. 2). This follows the logic that (a)
medicine uses RCTs and has found beneficial treatments, (b) psychology is searching for
beneficial treatments, (c) psychology can use RCTs like those used in medicine, and therefore (d)
psychology will find beneficial and non-beneficial treatments.
The problem with this logic is that the fields are not analogous in what they are
attempting to research. Psychology cannot create a placebo therapy group because, as Wompold
and colleagues (1997) state, psychology researchers examine outcomes as opposed to process;
thus, the “active ingredients” are not understood, and the outcomes that are measured are those
that best represent the language of the theory. In psychological research, it is unlikely that a
primary investigator would utilize a measure of ego strength to assess the effectiveness of a
behavioral therapy. Why would this be? The metaphoric language that comprises behavioral
therapy does not lend itself to being described in terms of an ego. Conversely, medical
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researchers can create placebos because the active ingredient of a medication is substituted with
an inert ingredient such as sugar. Despite these large methodological limitations in psychological
research, the logic follow that because medicine has found beneficial treatments through this
type of research, it then psychology likely found beneficial treatments using the same type of
research. Thus, the “winners”—the bona fide, empirically supported, or evidence-based
treatments—become reified by a process not entirely suited to psychological research.
Wampold et al. (1997) suggested that any intervention that is designed to therapeutic will
be therapeutic, and despite vast differences in the tested treatments, the difference in effect sizes
in meta-analytic studies are near 0. These results support the Dodo bird effect, whereby all
theories that guide the therapeutic process are found to be effective because they are intended to
be effective. It is plausible to suggest that what is therapeutic in psychotherapy is that one
individual (the therapist) interacts with another individual (the patient) in an attempt to help that
person experience the world differently. The language of the theory is what guides the human
interaction between therapist and patient. Thus, a shift must occur in psychology so that at least
some research is focused on understanding how the therapeutic process is guided by the
clinician’s theoretical paradigm.
These previous statements are not to refute the utility of clean research designs or even
the potential need to update and change the language and theories in psychology. Rather, the
statements are to encourage the exploration of how a theory’s language guides its research and
practice. By utilizing a meta-theory to explore how culture and language create the metaphors of
a theoretical paradigm, the clinician can be better prepared to engage in education, research, and
practice. In essence, a meta-theory provides a way of making meaning of Psychology’s own
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meaning making processes. Or, in reference to the aforementioned paragraphs, what yields the
active ingredients within the therapeutic process.
Application to Other Theoretical Paradigms
Psychoanalysis is not the only paradigm that functions as a metaphor, or is comprised of
metaphors. The present meta-theory serves as a means to understand the various theoretical
paradigms salient in psychology today. This is because there is an underlying assumption of
many theories: Given the nature of therapy, there must be a purposive way of interacting with
individuals to effect change. Regardless of the conceptual framework of a theory, whether the
mind is a function of the brain or separate from it, many theories rely on the ontological
metaphor that the mind (or in other cases the psyche or the self) is an entity. This ontological
metaphor allows clinicians to interact, to conduct research, or to understand the human
experience. Each theory has its language steeped within a sociohistorical context and influenced
by an individual or a group of individuals.
Cognitive–Behavior Therapy. Cognitive–Behavior Therapy (CBT) has the core,
ontological metaphor that the mind is an entity. That is, the mind or psyche exists regardless of
whether it is a function of the brain (monism), or is separate from the brain (dualism). However,
the mind is not a container for personified entities to exist but, rather, a machine that can be
worked on. As such, the conventional mind-as-machine metaphor is evoked. One may notice the
engineering-esque language in CBT such as (1) restructuring cognitions, (2) providing tools to
the patient, or (3) fixing or challenging faulty cognitions.
Instead of conflicting with warring, human entities (id, ego, superego), the language of
CBT is built around the metaphor of faulty machinery. The patient, then, can receive tools to fix
their own faulty machinery and make it run more effectively. This lends itself to another
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ontological metaphor in that what the clinician provides is tangible. A strategy, technique, or tool
can be utilized by patients outside of therapy when they need it, and “stored” when they do not.
The clinician takes an active role in therapy because he or she is an expert of the mind’s
machinery and can provide the patient with the necessary tools to fix the machinery.
The metaphors, just like psychoanalysis, are present and nested around a core metaphor
of the mind. What differ are the types of metaphors and the manner in which the language is
presented. Rachman (1997) described how CBT evolved from the integration of behaviorism and
cognitive therapy. Theorists Rachman, Thorndike, Beck, and Ellis were instrumental in
developing the framework for CBT. That is, Thorndike first popularized behaviorism while Beck
and Ellis promoted variants of cognitive therapy. Each of these individuals lived in 20th century
America and, like Freud, was influenced by the sociohistorical context. While there will not be
extensive discussion of these individuals’ sociohistorical context and phenomenological
associations, it can be appreciated that 20th century America with the growing influence of
psychology and its presence in U.S. Military during WWI and WWII as well as the advances in
technology and computing (Pickren & Rutherford, 2010) all had a profound influence on the
language utilized to create the metaphors of Behaviorism, Cognitive Therapy, and ultimately,
CBT.
Implications for The Use of a Meta-theory
The overarching purpose of this research was to change the way in which theoretical
paradigms are utilized by Psychology, and this is applicable to pedagogy, research, and practice.
Rather than reifying one theory or technique over another, this research suggests that a
clinician’s theory is a means to comprehend the nebulous process of psychotherapy. As such,
images, stories, linguistic constructions (e.g., super + ego = above I), and things are placed in a
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relationship with psychological phenomena (e.g., depression, anxiety, adjustment problems, and
recurring patterns of interpersonal relationships). The result are metaphors that a clinician can
utilize to think about her or his role in the therapeutic dyad by having some way to predict where
to guide the conversation. These metaphors are taught in graduate programs, researched by
practitioners and academicians, and consumed by lay people. However, rather than reifying these
metaphors, it may be more useful to explore them.
General implications. The present research acknowledges both the universality and
diversity that exist among Psychology’s various meta-theories. Each meta-theory possesses core
metaphors that are unique to theoretician, time, and culture and around which other metaphors
are nested. The differences in core metaphors signify the dynamic nature of language and the
continual need to change so as to remain alive and salient. Yet, it also illuminates the universal
process of attaching language to the ineffable nature of human experience—a process in and of
itself ineffable. In this sense, the present research celebrates the richness of diverse cultural
worldviews and individual experiences while it simultaneously reminds us of our common goal
in psychology. To some degree, the present research is similar to and different from
Psychology’s other meta-theories, such as psychoanalysis and CBT. It is important to keep in
mind the universality/diversity continuum when considering the pedagogical, research, and
practice implications that follow.
Pedagogical implications. While the topic of doctoral students has been explored to
some degree in the literature, this research focused on personality traits that are linked to a
chosen theoretical paradigm. Boswell, Castonguay, and Pincus (2009) found that individuals
who gravitated to the CBT paradigm tended to score lower on the Openness, Anger Hostility,
and Impulsivity scales of the NEO-PI-R when compared to those doctoral students who
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gravitated more towards the humanistic or psychodynamic traditions. The authors hypothesized
that this finding may be attributed to the possibility that those students who were more closed off
or unaware of their emotions may have gravitated towards CBT because the theory focuses on
emotional control, rather than emotional deepening.
The aforementioned research does not illuminate why doctoral students may gravitate
towards a particular theoretical orientation. However, if theoretical paradigms are understood as
metaphors, then the question becomes what are the ontological and epistemological assumptions
that the doctoral student (or any mental health trainee) posses. Stated differently, how does the
trainee understand the world, the role of therapy, and the process by which therapeutic change
occurs? The utilization of a trait model to understand the trainees’ proclivities can potentially
lead an institution, or a program, to address the trainees’ weaknesses, pathologizing and making
the ontological assumption that the theoretical paradigms are like options from which trainees
choose. Rather, the utilization of the present meta-theory would suggest an alternative
pedagogical approach. Given that theoretical paradigms are composed of and serve as metaphors,
it may be more useful to explore the trainees’ associations to the metaphors by encouraging
reflective learning.
Essentially, the trainees are asked to develop a deeper understanding to the paraphiers
that are present within a given theory, and to explore what the vehicle is attempting to convey
through its relationship with the topic. For instance, in a Personality Theory course, students
could be asked to reflect on (a) what their associations are to the id (examining the paraphiers),
(b) what psychological phenomena the id is attempting to generate meaning about (examining
the relationship between the vehicle and topic), (c) how the trainees understand the psychological
phenomena after the reflection on the id (examining the paraphrands and displaced paraphiers),
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(d) how the trainees may understand the id in reference to the other concepts evocatively
described in psychoanalytic thought (examining how the nested metaphors of psychoanalysis
interact with one another), (e) what the function of the mind is (examining the core metaphor of
the mind), and (f) how they believe the id would manifest in the therapy room and how they as
therapists would respond (examining the Peircean object of psychoanalysis based on what it
symbolizes [the manifestation of the id which is the Peircean sign] and what it means in terms of
process [the logic behind the responses and where it comes from in the literature which are the
Peircean interpretants]).
This process of reflection can take place in the form of both reflection papers and class
discussion because it parallels the phenomenological and socially constructed development of
the theoretical paradigm. Moreover, discussing the evocative language of a theory can help
deepen the trainees’ understanding of the theory and shift their thinking from a theory being a
tool, to a theory being about meaning making and guiding process. Boswell and colleagues
(2009) posited that novice trainees often integrated other paradigmatic techniques into their
theory of choice due to the perceived limitations of their theory. The present research may serve
as a guide for trainees and clinicians to integrate different theories in a purposive manner based
on the chosen theories’ lexica. For instance, combining the mind-as-machine metaphor with the
anthropomorphism of the id, ego, and superego may feel disjointed or haphazard to clinician and
patient alike. While the actual metaphors of the theory may not be utilized, how they inform the
process of therapy may be disrupted. Adding homework assignments focused on the present may
be discordant to associating freely and discussing past relationships if it is done haphazardly.
Professors of Professional Seminar and Case Conference courses may wish to explore (a) why
integration is occurring, (b) how the integration is being implemented, and (c) the level of
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understanding of the theories being integrated. These types of discussions with trainees may be
beneficial to have them think more deeply about their theory or theories as well as more deeply
about how and when to integrate.
Similarly, to foster a deeper understanding of the language and ideas conveyed within a
theoretical paradigm, it may be helpful to explore the sociohistorical contexts of when the major
theories were developed. While it is important to learn important dates and major events in a
History of Psychology course, it may also be beneficial to consider using discourse about the
sociohistorical contexts that influenced the trainees’ theories of choice. One individual’s present
is another’s past. As such, it is important to understand the sociohistorical context in which the
trainees’ live. By exposing students to context of history and comparing it to the present allows
them to develop a greater appreciation for why a theory is structured the way it is, rather than
descending to ad hominem attacks about the theoretician, or reifying a theory as immutable in
terms of language and concept.
Finally, it may also be beneficial to work with students to reflect on how their theories of
choice may influence their language, posture, thinking, and behavior in practice. Case
Conference and Professional Seminar courses as well as practicum and internship supervision are
rife with opportunities to explore these influences. The goal of such an exercise is to help the
trainee develop insight into how his or her meaning making processes influence his or her
interactions with the patient. If, as therapists, we require our patients to reflect on and examine
themselves, why would we not train future clinicians to do the same?
Research implications. There are a multitude of avenues that future researchers may
take regarding this meta-theory. It is important for researchers to understand that this research
was designed to make meaning from Psychology’s meaning making processes. Especially since
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theoretical paradigms are understood as meaning making devices rather than veridical, reified
constructs, and intended to help clinicians think about how to help patients make meaning out of
their lives and experiences. Lambert and Barley (2002) found that nearly 30% of the variance of
adult treatment outcomes was due to common process factors. This finding was significant when
controlling for therapeutic technique, which accounted for 15% of the treatment outcome
variance. Rather than treating theoretical paradigms as if they were medications and conducting
research on which paradigm is more effective, researchers should focus on patients’ perceptions
of what was most helpful in therapy what was most helpful for the clinicians in those same cases.
Researchers have investigated the influences that one’s worldview has on choosing a
theoretical paradigm. For instance, how a clinician’s ontological and epistemological views of
psychotherapy—for instance, whether psychotherapy viewed as a medical treatment or
existential process—influence her or his choice of theoretical paradigms and how the theory is
used as a model of praxis. Norcross and Prochaska (1983) found that clinicians were more
satisfied with their theoretical paradigms than researchers. The authors found that 94% of
clinicians utilized their theoretical paradigms often or repeatedly. This was based on the fact that
clinicians made deliberate choices for their theoretical paradigms based on clinical experience,
personal philosophy and values, and graduate training. Further research into these decisionmaking processes would reflect greater insight into the phenomenological and socially
constructed aspects of choosing a theoretical paradigm.
Aside from the usage and selection of theoretical paradigms, researchers could focus on
the processing of theoretical paradigms. That is, given the evocative and metaphoric nature of
psychology’s theories, it may be helpful to understand some of the neurophysiological correlates
of their use. Chen, Widick, and Chaterjee (2008), Gioria, Saidel, Soroker, Batori, and Kasher
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(2000), Rapp, Leube, Erb, Grodd, and Kircher (2004), Yang, Edens, Simpson, and Kawczyk
(2009), and Yoshimura and colleagues (2009) have all found neurophysiological differences
between literal speech and various types of metaphoric speech. That is, various parts of the brain
such as parts of the left and right hemisphere, the amygdalae, and the inferior and middle
temporal gyri have been indicated in terms of processing metaphors. Future researchers may
consider investigating if there are differences in how information is processed using a theoretical
paradigm versus using literal speech. To elucidate this point, future researchers may present a
clinician with phrases such as “John Doe feels depressed” as a (more) literal utterance and “John
Doe’s superego is extremely harsh” as a theoretical utterance. Novice and experienced clinicians
could be compared to determine changes in processing over time. The findings may shed light on
what is elicited at the neurophysiological level. For instance, do theoretical paradigms cause
greater activation in parts of the brain associated with emotion? Pending certain advances in
technology and neuroimaging, researchers may investigate whether theoretical paradigms are
processed differently based on experience and fluency with a particular theoretical paradigm. It
should be strongly cautioned that neuroimaging research should not be utilized as a metaphor for
the present meta-theory. That is, given the use and desire for utilizing theoretical paradigms (cf.
Norcross & Prochaska, 1983), it may be of use to explore the brain’s response to the use of a
theory. Neuroimaging studies, however, should neither be utilized as proof to the existence of
metaphoric language in a theory, nor utilized to as a proof to the philosophy of the present metatheory, which may result in confirmatory hypothesis testing and the reification of the present
theory. Rather, neuroimaging research in this area would help to better understand one facet of
the brain’s response to meaning making processes.
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Finally, future investigators could generate more theoretical research to understand why
theories exist in psychology, and thus, engage in more constructive discourse about similarities
and differences amongst the various paradigms. Rather than reifying a particular theoretical
paradigm, more discourse may generate greater understanding about how to interact with
patients in a meaningful and meaning-focused manner. By having open discourse about how to
make the nebulous process of therapy more concrete and available to clinicians, it is plausible
that it will be the patients who ultimately benefit. Rather than determining whether a theory or
practice is efficacious as a treatment option, this research was intended to understand how and
why theoretical paradigms are processed, utilized, and understood, which is important given the
fact that clinicians continue to gravitate towards a model of praxis.
Practice implications. Theoretical paradigms help to organize clinical data into a
comprehensive narrative that can guide how the clinician thinks about and interacts with the
patient. It provides the clinician with the capacity to predict to varying degrees what may be
helpful and what may be harmful to the patient. A theory can guide the clinician to what
questions to ask or what to pay attention to during the therapeutic hour. However, when a theory
is understood to serve as a metaphor, it serves additional purposes within the therapeutic context.
First, it draws the clinician’s attention to the fact that something (vehicle) must be placed
into a relationship to something else (topic), in order to form the metaphor. Those unknown
constructs, the psychological phenomena that are studied and treated, become more
understandable through the metaphors that are created. The metaphors that comprise the theory
as well as the theory itself serving as an ontological and epistemological metaphor are what are
utilized to connect what is observable with a patient (e.g., behavior, language, patterns) and what
is observable at the biological level (e.g., neurophysiology, chemistry, physics). Since the
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clinician cannot directly interact with a neuron or system of neurons to effect change, they can
only observe what a patient says or does. The metaphors attempt to connect the two with a
narrative so as to guide the clinician’s interventions. It shifts the focus from the psychological
phenomena being a product of biology, the environment, or some combination of the two, to the
phenomena being an explanation for something that is yet completely known.
Psychologically, one draws inferences from experiences and, thus, creates meaning when
none exists. That is the role of metaphor: To convey meaning by linking two things together
when there is an unknown. This can be a significant shift for those who may consider these
psychological phenomena to be veridical, static things such as an id, an ego, a superego, a
schema, or a reinforcer. These terms, when understood as metaphors, encourages flexibility and
exploration with the language rather than reifying it and making the vernacular immutable. This
also helps with the understanding that the language utilized within the metaphor was developed
within a specific sociohistorical context, which included the theoretician’s lived experiences,
society’s knowledge at the time, and the interface of the two through discourse.
Second, with the understanding that a theoretical paradigm serves as an ontological and
epistemological metaphor, the clinician must then explore how this metaphor shapes his or her
view of the patient, the treatment, and the potential outcomes. Clinicians must be aware of how
their theoretical paradigms create biases either in terms of what can be done, what will be
understood as significant, or what will be understood as not significant. Moreover, the metaphor
influences the way in which the clinician interacts with the patient. As a contrast, the
mind-as-machine metaphor influences the clinician to provide tools and to fix problems while
the tripartite, personification metaphor of the id, ego, and superego would indicate a mediation
between the three factions.
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Third, and similarly, theoretical paradigms serve as a way to provide information about
what is being considered salient for a case, but they also serve as a means to convey what is not
being considered salient by the clinician. As a supervisor or consultant, this can lead to a fruitful
exploration of what is being missed by the supervisee or consultee. The metaphoric language of
the theory, thus, opens and constrains a clinician’s capacity to work. By understanding the theory
as serving as a metaphor, it permits the supervisor and supervisee to step away from the language
of the theory and examine the potential oversights before returning to the theory to reengage in
the clinical work. For example, a supervisor and supervisee could explore the use of cognitive or
mindfulness strategies as being in service of the ego or explore how countertransference could be
a self-schema being elicited in the therapy session. By reifying the concepts or manualizing the
treatment, such a conversation may never occur between supervisor and supervisee (or even with
oneself).
Finally, according to Boswell and colleagues (2009) and Orlinsky and Rønnestad (2005),
there was a shift, both internationally and domestically, towards being integrative or eclectic.
Moreover, Ambhül and Olinsky (1997) described how clinicians are reporting similarities and
differences in therapeutic goals based on their preferred theoretical orientation. As such, there
has been an interest in integrating theories. Understanding that theoretical paradigms comprise of
metaphors would indicate that the metaphors being integrated together are congruent with one
another. For instance, from a psychoanalytic frame, providing a set of cognitive tools and
relaxation strategies to fix a machine (mind-as-machine metaphor) is incongruent if it is not fully
integrated into the psychoanalytic language. However, if the cognitive tools are understood as an
object being presented, then the focus shifts from fixing something (mind-as-machine metaphor)
to providing nurturance for the ego (personification metaphor). This change may seem small, but
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consider the implications following the object presentation. What may ensue may be a discussion
about the transference of receiving something, or being told to do something. This would be
different if it were presented as a homework assignment in more traditional CBT terms.
Conversely, discussing the relationship between the clinician and patient may seem somewhat
out of place in a CBT model of praxis. However, when framed in terms of the various schemata
and faulty cognitions, it serves as in vivo exposure and collaborative work to redress the faulty
cognition. Homework may ensue to practice what occurred in therapy rather than, if the clinician
were using a personification metaphor, to serve as an exploration of past relationships and
transferences.
While it may seem minute to simply ensure that the metaphors are congruent, it extends
beyond the actual words and moves into the realm of how these words manifest. Even though the
theoretical language may never be disclosed to the patient, incongruence with the metaphor may
lead to incongruence in the work. A new assignment (as in the psychodynamic case) or a new
topic of discussion (as in the CBT case) may seem disjointed and out of place with the previous
modus oparandi. As such, understanding theory as metaphor requires a purposive and precise
integration and a strong understanding of the language of both theories.
Limitations
First, given that this meta-theory is in and of itself a metaphor, it is important to consider
that these metaphors should not become reified. However, with the use of ontological
metaphors—as in the creation of nested metaphors, objects, vehicles, interpretants, and sign, for
instance—there is without a doubt a chance that this present theory, too, will become reified.
What was important to glean from this research was that the language that constructed the
various theoretical paradigms, and this meta-theory, was flexible. Additionally, in order to
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remain salient, the language needs to be adjusted to meet the demands of a future time and
place—sociohistorical context.
Second, this present research was theoretical. Thus, it was an integration and extension of
known concepts to address a dearth in the literature. Schafer (1981, 2003) described the
anthropomorphism and visuospatial metaphors within psychoanalysis. However, his concepts
were never examined in the same light as this research. While Schafer detailed the metaphors
that existed within psychoanalysis and the need to reduce the jargon of the metaphors, he did not
detail the process of the creation of the metaphor. Jaynes (1976) provided the theory about the
creation of metaphors, but only tenuously extended the theory into psychology. Schefer, Jaynes,
nor this study’s author extended the theoretical work to hypothesis testing or qualitative research
methodology. As such, it could be argued that a limitation of this research was that it did not go
far enough to extend the thoughts of previous authors. Yet, it can be argued that this meta-theory
served as the foundation for future research.
Finally, although within the purview of the ontological and epistemological assumptions
of this research, one limitation was that there was a phenomenological influence regarding what
could be considered a core metaphor for each of the theories. That is, how one interprets the
writings of a theory may influence how one interprets the core metaphor around which all other
metaphors within the theory envelop. Moreover, even the types of metaphors that are utilized
within a theory could be argued persuasively. Yet, this limitation also was a strength of this
research in that it encourages discourse, exploration, and reflection regarding any theoretical
paradigm to which this meta-theory was applied. This was in accordance with the other
ontological and epistemological assumption of this research, which was that discourse and dialog
(social constructionism) formed the other half of the reality and knowing. As such, this
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meta-theory attempted to promote the processes and assumptions that constructed it. However,
each of the limitations that existed served as the foundation to further develop the understanding
of Psychology’s theoretical paradigms.
Conclusion
This research detailed how theoretical paradigms are composed of metaphors, and served
as metaphors for clinicians. More specifically, a vehicle (better known construct) and topic
(lesser known construct) placed in a relationship to one another within a particular frame. The
paraphiers that are displaced onto the metaphrand of the topic helps dictate what type of
metaphor is being created. This process occurs multiple times within Psychology’s various
theoretical paradigms. For many theories, the core metaphor, which dictates the language of the
other nested metaphors, is created around the topic of the mind. That is, the mind is a machine,
space, or thing which can be fixed, exist in, or manipulated and interacted with. The theory itself,
served as a metaphor for the clinician’s own ontology and epistemology. The theory, when
serving as a metaphor, is governed by Peircean semiotics whereby the metaphor serves as the
object in the psychotherapeutic exchange between clinician and patient. The evocative language
of a theory is influenced by the theoretician’s own associations (based in phenomenology), and
the meaning created within a society through discourse and interaction (based on social
constructionism).
By understanding theoretical paradigms as metaphors—both being comprised of
metaphors and serving as a metaphor—pedagogy, research, and practice can be reconsidered.
The implications for this meta-theory challenges educators, researchers, academicians, and
clinicians to question what is real in psychology and what guides what we do. Despite this
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research’s limitations, this meta-theory encourages reflection and discourse to foster a deeper
understanding of Psychology’s theories by examining the very language that comprises them.
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Appendix A
A glossary of terms is provided for ease of reference. Only those terms that are utilized for the
duration of the manuscript are provided (cf. Figure 1 for how each of these terms relate to one
another)
Term
Frame
Metaphier
Metaphrand
Paraphier

Paraphrand
Topic

Vehicle

Definition
the context, whether linguistic or contextual, that serves as the
minimal unit to establish incongruity (Kittay, 1987).
a known or concretized concept placed in relation to the
metaphrand (see below; Jaynes, 1976)
a lesser known construct placed in relation to the metaphier (see
above; Jaynes, 1976)
attributes of the metaphier that can be displaced to varying degree
onto the metaphrand (Jaynes, 1976)
attributes of the metaphier that have become displaced onto the
metaphrand, thus, becoming attributes associated with the
metaphors (Jaynes, 1976)
the subject of the text (Kittay, 1987) and, for this research, is
comprised the metaphrand and its paraphrands
the phrase or word utilized to transport the content of an idea and
is used in relation to the topic (Kittay, 1987) and, for this research,
is comprised of the metaphier and its paraphiers
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Appendix B

Conventional metaphors tend to have a hidden metaphoric structure and, as such, may not appear
to be metaphors at all. However, these metaphors (provided below) are common in colloquial
speech and are, nonetheless, metaphors and not literal utterances.
Metaphor

Type of Metaphor

Examples

Arguments are battles and
aggression

Argument-is-War Metaphor

Your claims are indefensible.
I demolished his argument.
Think that you can do better?
Shoot!

Theory and arguments are
buildings

Building Metaphor

The foundation of his theory
is x. Her argument fell apart.
What is your conceptual
framework?*

Containers hold abstractions

Container Metaphor

You put in plenty of effort.
My argument has holes in it. I
am filled with hope.

Journeys orient progress and
content

Journey Metaphor

We haven’t covered much
ground (distance). She is
going in circles (directness).

Conscious is up; Unconscious Orientational Metaphor
is down

Wake up/Fall asleep; Under
hypnosis; Sank into a coma

Health and life are up;
sickness and death are down

Orientational Metaphor

She’s at her peak/He’s
suffering declining health;

Theory is a person

Personification Metaphor

Her theory explained
everything; Inflation is
destroying the dollar.

Time is a substance and
resource

Structural Metaphor

I gave him my time. That took
a lot of time to complete.*

Time moves

Time-is-a-Moving-Object
Metaphor

As time passes by. Her time
will come. The arrival of the
Winter Break.*
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Time-is-Money Metaphor

We’ve spent enough time
examining this. You’ll save
time by working on your
dissertation now.*

Note. Examples of conventional metaphors are provided from Lakoff and Johnson’s (2003)
Metaphors We Live By. Those examples denoted with an asterisk (*) are provided by the
present author.

